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Preface 
For nearly 45 years since the end of the Second World War, 
the united States and the Soviet union have engaged in a war of 
words (with some deeds, carried out in the Developing World.) In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a considerable amount 
of debate over which system would dominate the world. Each side 
presented their relative merits vis-a-vis the other. Many people 
today remember the tense debates in the United Nations during the 
Khrushchev years, where the Soviet Premier banged his shoe on the 
table and shouted "we will bury you" when confronted by western 
ideology. The "Kitchen Debate" between Khrushchev and then-Vice­
President Nixon also gripped a world debating the economic 
arrangements of the future. 
with the tearing down of the Berlin wall and the crumbling 
of the Warsaw Pact, many in the West are proclaiming victory for 
capitalism and democracy. But this victory for capitalism does 
not mean the economic hardships of the developing world should go 
unnoticed. Capitalism may be successful for the Wall Street 
banker in New York City or the Plant Manager in Tokyo, but for 
the sugar-cane laborer in Bahia, Brazil or the mine-worker in the 
Shaba region of Zaire, the fruits of victory taste not so sweet. 
Obviously, the pOlicies of the post-war era have brought little 
but hardship to millions in the world. 
Now is a unique time to reassess the characteristics of the 
theories which dominate Western economic advice. with President 
Bush postulating his "New World Order," the developing nations 
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will want to benefit from his vision. No longer may Western 
leaders hide their disinterest in Third World economic 
development in Cold war rhetoric. with East-West issues 
decreasing in importance, the rise of North-South issues will 
dominate the international agenda. The United States must 
address these issues, or they face greater isolation from a 
vastly more-powerful "Group of 77." Finally, with the advent of 
television, scenes of extreme poverty are readily accessible to 
everyone. Therefore, the united States can no longer 
disassociate itself with the economic problems of the Third 
World. It is against this backdrop that I write this thesis. 
April 27, 1991 
Illinois Wesleyan University 
Bloomington, IL 
Douglas J. Becker 
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5 
Introduction 
The united states has both the moral responsibility and a 
practical interest in economic development in the Third World. 
Morally, the u.s. and its Western allies have responsibility for 
two reasons. First and foremost, we have postulated that our 
presence in the Third World would benefit the entire world. 
Economic interdependence is thought to be one of the true assets 
of free trade and economic assistance. Unfortunately, the 
optimism within the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD, or World Bank) have little empirical evidence to support 
their claims. The U.s. has promised economic development to the 
Third World as reward for strong ties with the West. The Third 
World has legitimate demands for that development. 
Secondly, the world is truly becoming a global village. As 
poet John Donne wrote centuries ago, "Ask not for whom the bell 
tolls, for it tolls for thee. II At the end of the 20th Century, 
the world must fully recognize that the death of one person 
because of poverty or underdevelopment is a loss for the entire 
world. This poverty must be alleviated through true economic 
development. The united Nations, through the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, has recognized each nation's 
inherent right to develop.1 For these human rights 
considerations, the United states has the moral responsibility to 
foster Third World development. 
The U.S. also has significant practical reasons for 
-6 
supporting Third World development. Promises of economic aid 
were crucial in the Bush Administration's forging of an anti-Iraq 
coalition in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Also, true 
development would make the nations of the world stronger allies 
to the West. Increased economic productivity in a diversified 
economy would make these nations stronger trading partners. 
Finally, the u.s. must move beyond its short-sightedness in its 
policymaking. All to often, these short-run considerations have 
made Third World leaders enemies of the u.s. when they should not 
be. 2 These considerations must weigh heavily in the minds of 
American policymakers as they postulate the "New World Order" to 
which President Bush so often refers. 
Sadly, aid had been granted too often with Cold War 
considerations in mind. True economic development has been 
disregarded for short-term goals and military assistance in times 
of crisis. with the thawing of the Cold War and the renewed 
interest in the Third World, a drastic rethinking of economic 
development questions will be uniquely relevant for the coming 
decades. Because the theories may no longer be sUfficiently 
wrapped in Cold War, anti-Communist rhetoric, u.S. policymakers 
must consider new ideas. With this backdrop in world events, now 
is the proper time to review the literature concerning economic 
development, and ask the question: Have the pOlicies prescribed 
for the Third World proven beneficial? This is the main purpose 
of this project. 
History holds a great deal of evidence as to the most 
..
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prudent policy prescriptions for economic development. Because 
of a lack of sufficient proof of any of the economic theories 
propounded to date, a trial and error method is perhaps the only 
possible approach to economic development questions. We must 
learn from past successes and failures. This is why a largely 
historic account of the economic policies of the two countries I 
detail in this thesis is necessary. In other words, we must 
learn from history. 
This account begins by reviewing the literature on economic 
development. Walt Whitman Rostow, with his work stages of 
Economic Growth, ushered a new age of writing on "modernization 
theory." His subtitle A Non-Communist Manifesto suggested that 
his was the alternative to Marxism. His work spawned a great 
deal of literature on the issue. The Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations in particular used Rostow and colleagues to 
justify further aid to the Third World. Rostow's assumptions 
still linger today, and deserve to be addressed. 
I wish to place these assumptions in an empirical light by 
using two case studies: South Korea and Brazil. The first is 
that they represent two different continents. In this way, I 
hope to call the global nature of the theories into question. In 
other words, the prescriptions for the Pacific Rim may be quite 
different than those for South America. I have also chosen these 
two nations because they represent caricatures of different 
levels of success. South Korea appears to be one of the greatest 
successes of the 20th Century. Many a theorist has argued the 
-8 
economic power has shifted to the Pacific Rim, of which South 
Korea plays an integral role. Brazil is a telling case because 
it was, too, a major success story. But the weight of economic 
development fell upon that nation, producing a huge debt which is 
serviced only through hardship and extreme inflation. Perhaps 
the mistakes of the "Brazilian miracle" can be avoided when South 
Korea faces its economic decisions. The two nations also present 
a challenge to show that Korea will not fall under the weight of 
its own debt and face the same future an Brazil. 
Finally, I hope to offer prescriptions for nations wishing 
to develop. Most importantly, I hope to offer insight to 
American policymakers wishing to join in the economic development 
of the Third World. But I would like to stress the need to 
listen, as well as advise. All too often, Americans assume they 
are correct in their assertions and listen far too little to the 
very people they wish to help. These are simple observations and 
suggestions by an American student. Take them at that value. 
-10 
Chapter 1: 
Modernization Theory 
The most important theory coming out of Western institutions 
is the mOdernization theory. It states that the nations of the 
Third World have yet to develop, but it is a historic process 
that must take place within each individual nation. The 
developed world has little or no impact in the underdevelopment 
of these nations, and they must take steps themselves to develop. 
The West has a role to play in the development of these nations, 
but it is a supplementary and a supportive role. 
The Intellectual Roots of Economic Development Theory 
Most of the mOdernization theorists were influenced by the 
work of sociologist Max Weber. In his famous work The Rise of 
Protestantism and the spirit of Capitalism, Weber argues that' 
religious ideology drove Western Europeans to embark in business 
ventures, and served as the driving force behind capitalism. 
Fear of God produced love of material wealth. Therefore, it is 
Protestantism that explains why the Western Europeans are so far 
more advanced technologically than the rest of the world. 
Particularly important in this ideology is the thought of 
John Calvin. Calvin argued that God had predestined everyone who 
had been saved. The only way a person could learn of his 
salvation was through economic success. Therefore, Calvinists 
worked long hours trying to prove their salvation. It is from 
this work ethic that capitalism was born. 
-It is from this vein that the modernization theorists 
embarked on their theories of underdevelopment. A great deal of 
the focus was, and continues to be, on the spirit of 
entrepreneurship. Capitalism is based on risk. This willingness 
to take a risk forces a nation out of the clutches of 
backwardness and enables it to embark on development. But, there 
is no reward for the coward. Therefore, this spirit of 
entrepreneurship must be built of the nation is to develop. This 
central tenet of liberalism flows through the entire body of 
literature produced by the modernization theorists. 
The Liberal Context 
So, as stated above, American economic development theory is 
deeply rooted in the liberal tradition. This should not be 
surprising. As Karl Mannheim suggests, each person is driven ,by 
his/her ideology. It is impossible to separate the person from 
the assumptions under which (s)he is operating. 3 American 
policymakers are no different. The u.S. has been an economic 
success story, which in turn gives it an specific ideological 
hue. This context colors the prescriptions offered by both the 
theorists of economic development as well as the American 
policymakers who use the theorists to justify their policies. 
Robert A. Packenham, borrowing on the work by Louis Hartz in 
his famous work The Liberal Tradition in America, has identified 
four liberal assumptions which dominate economic development 
theory. These four are: 
I 
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1.	 Change and development are easy. 
2.	 All good things go together. 
3.	 Radicalism and revolution are Bad 
4.	 Distributing power is more important than 
accumulating power. 4 
believe these assumptions deserve further discussion. 
Change and development are easy is a concept derived from 
that fact that Americans were "born free." That is to say, it 
took little or no fundamental change in the social structure of 
the u.s. to bring about its revolution. 5 This has been 
described well by the historical schools of "American 
Exceptionalism." The colonists at the time of the Revolution 
were not calling for a radical change in their social structures. 
On the contrary, they were simply demanding the rights of 
Englishmen. The outcry against taxation without representation 
in Parliament suggests that, if given the right of 
representation, the American colonies would have remained loyal 
subjects of the Crown. Therefore, when the United states 
declared its independence, it had to do little more than defeat 
the British and their task was to be accomplished. After the 
Battle of Yorktown in 1783, the revolution was essentially 
completed. 
Also, the united states was blessed with two geographic 
advantages which fuel this belief. First, basically the entire 
continent was at the American disposal. There were no great 
empires on the North American continent, and a large expanse of 
land with which to develop. This fueled the American concept of 
Manifest Destiny, which in turn drove Americans to move West. 
li 
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Save the massacre of thousands of Native Americans, a moral 
question not to be raised in this thesis, Americans secured the 
land with little or no difficulty. Combine this with the reality 
that most of this land was fertile and well suited for 
development, the u.s. had quite the head start on other nations' 
economic development. 6 
This historical context colors what Packenham refers to as 
Americans "proclivity to tinker.,,7 Incremental change is always 
to be preferred. Americans are essentially problem-solvers. If 
there is a problem, there must be a solution. All it takes is 
the interest and the knowledge to solve these problems, and they 
will be solved. 
Never was this attribute more apparent than when Truman's 
Point Four Program was announced. Truman's intent when 
developing a program for Third World assistance was to "raise,the 
living standard of the Third World just 2%." If that could be 
accomplished, then markets for u.s. goods would increase 
drastically.8 It never occurred to Truman what true development 
would entail, and what sorts of programs would best induce 
development. Instead, it was assumed that this change would be 
relatively easy. 
This proclivity to tinker concretely produces a four-part 
process of project evaluation. First, policymakers focus on 
compliance control. This involves an observance of legislative 
and administrative requirements for a project to be implemented. 
The next focus is on management improvement. This follows from 
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the premise that corruption and laziness, coupled with a lack of 
expertise, cause the majority of problems in Third World 
development. Assign "a mover and a shaker" to the project and 
the work will be done. The next step is an assessment of project 
implementation. Here, the question is: Can the project be 
accomplished? The final focus is on the general assessment of 
whether this project will actually contribute to the development 
of the nation. Packenham refers to the entire process as the 
"aha!" approach. A person looks at the problem, shouts "aha!" 
when he discovers the problem, and then implements the proper 
policy.9 
There is little or no discussion on whether or not the 
problem is actually solvable. This follows from the assumption 
that change and development are easy. The true complexities of 
the problem are placed aside as the most efficient course of 
action is plotted. Unfortunately, this approach often results in 
wasted time, energy, and resources on a project which, when 
completed, resembles little like it was originally conceived. In 
addition, the project seldom has the impact desired. 
Americans are also deluded into believing that all good 
things go together. Concretely, this means that the prudence of 
economic development, especially in terms of growth of GNP and 
the incorporation of the entire nation in the economy is never 
called into question. We often disregard the costs of these 
actions when we consider the value of economic development. 10 
Examples of cases where all good things may not go together 
-14 
would be when traditional society is destroyed in an attempt to 
modernize the economy. I cite the destruction of the Native 
American and of the Aztec and Inca nations during European 
colonization as historical manifestations of this disregard for 
tradition. Currently, the Brazilian government is destroying 
Native tribes in the Amazon for the purposes of development, 
while the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" and Stalin's purges of the 
peasantry are further manifestations of this type of disregard 
for tradition. Obviously, in these cases, not all good things 
went together. Or, to be more precise, bad things often go with 
good things. Unfortunately, Americans have little sense of their 
own history, which explains the importance of this premise. 
Also, development in macroeconomic terms is often seen as 
absolutely positive development, because of appeals to this 
premise. A rise in GNP is seen as positive because other 
positive aspects were sure to follow. Therefore, little 
attention was paid to the human cost of authoritarian capitalist 
development in Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s, because 
of the tremendous economic growth. This neglect cost the 
Brazilian people a great deal. 
The third premise, that radicalism and revolution are bad, 
has driven the U.s. in the arms of conservatives throughout the 
world. True revolution (not the U.S.) is a "rapid, fundamental, 
and usually violent change in the dominant values and myths, 
political institutions, social structures, leadership, and 
governmental policies and activities of a society. ,,11 Coups, by 
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contrast, are simple changes of authority. This is why the U.S. 
often supports coups, especially those of right-wing, 
counterrevolutionary groups, while opposing revolutions. It is 
neither violence nor atrocity that the U.S. opposes. It is a 
fundamental change in the status quO.12 
The fourth premise, that distributing power is more 
important that accumulating it, is fundamental in American 
prescriptions for governments of Third World nations. American 
policymakers oppose single-party governments, dictatorships, and 
the like because of the inherent need for checks and balances. 
But, as Packenham asks, there are two relevant questions with 
respect to power. First, How much power is there? Second, How 
is power distributed? Americans are obsessed with the second 
question, but neglect the first. 13 To distribute power in a 
weak national government to disastrous. 
An example of this disaster is the infamous "rule by 
coronel" in Brazil during the First Republic, as well as the 
power of the caudillo throughout Latin America. The national 
government in Rio had very little relative power, while the 
coffee and sugar barons controlled their lands in a quasi-feudal 
system. The same is true of the rule by warlord in China 
following the Revolution of 1911 and of tribal rule throughout 
the African continent. The government must focus on 
accumulating power over the economy, and then modernize these 
sectors, before there is any serious consideration of 
distributing power. 
•
 
with these four assumptions in mind, there were three main 
doctrines to American development policy. The first and most 
influential was the Cold War doctrine. Aid was seen in 
realpolitik terms, as an incentive to support the u.s. on 
policies against the Soviet Union. 14 In more direct terms, aid 
was used first to bribe the Third World nation into supporting 
the U.S., and then to addict that nation by creating a dependence 
by that nation on the u.S. Packenham suggests that the Kennedy 
Administration was less guilty of this practice,15 but I find 
little or no proof to support his claims. The Alliance for 
Progress was known throughout Latin America as the Castro 
program, a sign that Kennedy's motives were quite clear. 
The second doctrine was the economic doctrine. 
Specifically, economic development was defined in terms of growth 
per capita product. 16 This means that the GNP, GOP, and NNP, 
all macroeconomic considerations, were the primary focus of 
economic development. This explains why the U.S. throughout the 
1980s could consider Nicaragua an economic failure when access to 
medicine, drinking water, and the level of literacy all rose 
under the Sandinistas.* 
Political development, a significant "spin-off" aspect of 
the economic doctrine, was also concretely defined. Development 
in these terms meant anti-communism, stability, "world 
* This is not to discount the ideological considerations behind 
American criticisms. But I believe the discrepancy between 
macroeconomic considerations and the quality-of-life considerations 
help explain American assertions which are backed up with "facts" 
produced by economists. 
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community," peace, pro-Americanism, and democracy. Obviously, 
the Cold War considerations weighed heavily in evaluation of 
political development. 17 
The third and least influential doctrine was the democratic 
doctrine. This was most evident in the Title IX program, which 
was a Congressional initiative during the Johnson Administration. 
It called for aid to be used through democratic institutions, so 
as to strengthen those institutions. Johnson supported the 
legislation, but his disinterest in initiating the bill showed 
his lack of concern for democratic principles vis-a-vis 
realpolitik and Cold War considerations. 18 
These were the assumptions and doctrines that followed from 
those assumptions. I will next discuss the intellectual roots 
behind the formulation of these policies, as embodied by the 
forefather of modernization theory, Walt Whitman Rostow. 
Rostow and the stages of Economic Growth 
In the 1950s, while Marxism appeared to be gripping the 
developing world, American academicians searched for an 
explanation of capitalism that stressed its more humane points. 
It is out of this context that the famous work stages of Economic 
Growth appears. Its author, Walt Whitman Rostow, was teaching at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1950s and 
early 60s. 19 His thesis would have profound effects on American 
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policymakers throughout the Cold War period.** 
Rostow's purpose for stages was an response to the economic 
determinism in Marxism writing. Stealing a page from Marx's 
work, Rostow identifies five stages of economic development.*** 
These five stages are as follows: 
1. The traditional society 
2. The pre-conditions for take-off 
3. The take-off 
4. The drive to maturity 
5. The age of high mass-consumption. 2o 
According to Rostow, each nation must pass through each of these 
five stages in the order that he presents them. 
The traditional society roughly corresponds with our concept 
of the feudal society of the Middle Ages. Rostow describes this 
society as one with heavy emphasis on agriculture. This 
agriculture is essentially sustenance-based, although he does 
suggest that a minimal amount of trading will take place. There 
is little economic contact with the outside world, and the 
farmer's main concern is producing a sufficient amount of his 
product to feed his family.21 This type of economic activity 
corresponds to the social structure of traditional society. 
Because of the influence of sustenance farming, coupled with 
the heightened role of the family, it is not surprising that 
traditional societies are based on hierarchical social 
* The most important of these influences was President Kennedy, 
whom Packenham refers to as a proponent of the Charles River Group. 
* Marx conceived of different stages of economic growth, passing 
from feudalism to capitalism to communism. It is from the premise 
of stages that are universally applicable that Rostow proceeds. 
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structures, with the father at the top of the scale. These 
social structures lead to a vertical immobility in society. This 
thought is a sort of fatalism that declares that I will go no 
farther than my father did. This discourages entrepr~neurship, 
which is the driving force of capitalism. 22 
Rostow identified four types of underdeveloped nations, not 
all of which were traditional in nature: 
1.	 Pre-take-off economies: Savings and investment 
rates, including limited net capital imports, are 
under 5% of the net national product (NNP, or 
everything produced in that nation for a given 
year. 
2.	 Economies attempting take-off: Savings and
 
investment rates over 5% of NNP.
 
3.	 Growina Economies: Savings and investments have 
exceeded 10% of NNP. 
4.	 Enclave Economies: Savings and investments exceed 
10%, but domestic conditions not conducive to take­
off. 23 
Obviously, the spirit of entrepreneurship, as exemplified through 
savings rates, are the most important considerations for a 
nation's capacity to develop. This is a phenomenon I will 
discuss more fully later in the chapter. 
There eventually comes a point in a nation's development 
where it witnesses the preconditions for take-off, the second of 
Rostow's stages of growth. He sees this stage as usually brought 
not from within, but from without. Wars, famines, and even the 
occupation of a nation are common impetuses for growth. 
Invasions from without shock the traditional society into 
accepting that development is required for something desired. 24 
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An example of this type of impetus was the forced opening of 
the Japanese ports by American Matthew Perry in 1854. Fearing 
domination by the West, the Japanese quickly thrust aside many of 
the traditions of the Tokegawa period, or the period of Japanese 
feudalism. In a short 14 years, there was a revolution (the 
Meiji Restoration), and a drastic shift in the social structure 
soon followed. These measures set the preconditions for take­
off, which began for Japan in the late 19th century. 
The preconditions include a broadening of education, the 
increase in volume and prestige of banking and commerce, and an 
increase in investment. Education must be broadened so that the 
aristocracy of traditionalism may be replaced by a meritocracy. 
The nation's economy must be managed by the best and the 
brightest. Banking and commerce increase in direct proportion to 
the increase of investment. Entrepreneurs must be willing to' 
invest their capital not in land, but in commercial ventures. 
Banking facilitates this drive to capitalism. 25 Once again, 
like most of the modernization theorists, Rostow focuses his 
theory on the spirit of entrepreneurship. 
The next and most important stage for Rostow is the take­
off. This is when the major thrust of industrialization and 
development takes place. In Rostow's own words, "Growth becomes 
a natural condition. ,,26 New industries expand rapidly, while 
new capital is invested for this industrialization. Growth rates 
shoot through the roof, and government investment into the 
economy should be minimal. Except for political "growing pains," 
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such as a conservative backlash against the uprooting of 
traditional society, the nation grows relatively quickly.27 
Whether a nation is prepared to take-off became the most 
important consideration for Rostow and his colleagues. Studies 
were produced showing the capacity for a nation to "absorb" the 
investment from the West. Once the take-off began, the West need 
not extend an excessive amount of aid to the nation. This type 
of policy was only beneficial for a nation to build and recognize 
the preconditions. The take-off was a period of self-sustaining 
growth This period of take-off would last around 40 years. 
Following this period, the nation then drives to maturity. 
Technology improves, and new industries accelerate. The economy 
then diversifies, so that the new-found growth is not as 
vulnerable to the whims of the market. Goods formerly imported 
are now produced at home. In this statement, Rostow supports ,the 
concept of import-substitution industrialization. The nation 
becomes more self-sufficient. 28 
Maturity is defined by Rostow in the following way: 
the stage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity 
to move beyond the original industries which powered 
its take-off and to absorb and to apply efficiently 
over a very wide range of its resources -- if not the 
whole range -- the most advanced fruits of the (then) 
modern technology. This is the stage in which an 
economy demonstrates that it has the technological and 
entrepreneurial ability to produce not everything, but 
anything it chooses to produce. 29 
The most important consideration is the efficient application of 
resources. There is a minimal amount of waste. Also, the nation 
is not physically limited in what it can produce. It must make 
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choices in a condition of scarcity, but what ever it chooses, it 
can produce. 
The final stage is the stage of high mass-consumption. This 
follows from two realities of maturity, 
1.	 real income per head rises to a point where a large 
number of persons gain a command over consumption, 
2.	 the structure of the working force changes in ways 
which increase not only the proportion of the urban 
to rural population, but also the proportions of 
population working in offices of skilled factory 
jobs. 30 
Both of these phenomena lead to high mass-consumption. 
A rise in the real income per head allows every person to 
have greater purchasing power. They will then consume more of 
the products produced by the industrial sector. The changing 
structure of the working force suggests that there will be more 
time to enjoy the fruits of success. The government can now 
spend more money on social security and welfare provisions. 31 
This stage is the desire of all capitalist nations. 
other important economists postulated conditions that growth 
would create. In the early 1970s, Simon Kuznets theorized that 
economic growth would be accompanied by three factors: 
1.	 change in the production structure, 
2.	 increase in the size of production units, 
3. rapid urbanization.~ 
These were all problems that the Newly Industrializing Country 
(NIC) would have to confront. For his work, Kuznets won the 
Nobel Prize for Economics. 
Sociological Considerations for Development 
-Rostow's analysis focused almost solely on economic 
considerations. Kuznets follows the same conceptual line. A 
large segment of the modernization theorists have focused on the 
sociological and political conditions and implications for 
development. These writers focus not on macroeconomic 
considerations, but instead on the internal political development 
of what they consider the necessary prerequisites for economic 
development. 
There are a number of significant features required for 
capitalist development. Perhaps the most important is the rise 
of the entrepreneurial class as the most significant sector of 
the economy. Joseph Shumpeter has defined entrepreneurship as 
the "capacity of leadership in innovation, for breaking through 
the routine and the traditional. ,,33 Seymour Martin Lipset has 
used this aspect of society as the most telling sign of oncoming 
economic modernization. Potential capitalists must be persuaded 
to invest their resources in capital ventures. In practical 
terms, they must invest their resources in industrialization, 
rather than in agriculture, A refusal to invest is the main 
cause of economic stagnation throughout the Third World. Only 
through a promotion of risk-taking will the nation develop its 
resources and modernize.~ 
There are a number of obstacles to the development of the 
entrepreneurial class in Third World nations. Lipset is 
particularly interested in the roles of the elites in the 
modernization process. In Latin America, the process of 
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colonization led to the development of a class of large land­
holders, or latifundios. These latifundios are hesitant to 
invest their excess capital in any venture other than that to 
develop their cash crops. They maintain a certain level of 
prestige in the continuation of the current economic arrangement. 
Therefore, they are hesitant to engage in the necessary steps to 
designate their excess capital for industrialization. 35 
Jacques Lambert, a French social scientist, has identified 
the latifundios as the most significant obstacle to social change 
in Latin America. He sees the problem of hoarding the land, as 
described earlier, as perhaps the most telling sign of stagnation 
throughout the region. Because the latifundios benefit from 
cheap labor tied to the land, they oppose social legislation that 
increase the political and economic power of the working classes. 
They are paramount in the government's unwillingness to allow' 
unionization of rural workers. Therefore, they stand as a 
formidable obstacle to change. 36 
Other theorists focus on different types of elites as the 
thrust of their discourse on political and economic 
mOdernization. Robert E. Scott has focused his work on the 
former political elites and their orientation. He sees as 
essential the rise of professional bureaucrats to deal with 
pUblic policy, thereby de-politicizing the process. In this 
process, the landed aristocracy must turn over their power to the 
entrepreneurial elite, who then turn over authority to 
bureaucrats. 37 This type of power transfer is essential if the 
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nation is to set aside its ideological differences and forge a 
working coalition based on the desire to industrialize and 
modernize. 
Kalman Silvert has described the type of person needed for 
industrial modernization to occur. The "modern person" is a 
relativist in that he does not seek absolute truth in pUblic 
affairs, and is, above all, a compromiser. He rejects absolute 
moral precepts as the legitimate arbiter of social affairs, 
choosing instead to rely on the rule of law and case precedent. 
In other words, the modern person is a thankless bureaucrat. He 
is non-ideological, and is interested in efficiency.438 This 
emphasis on a anti-absolutism in political decision-making is a 
central feature of a number of modernization theorists. 
Latin American modernization theorists have focused heavily 
on the historic development of the region. They point, in 
particular, to the role that the "Mediterranean Ethos" has played 
on the history of that region. For Lipset, the driving factor in 
the region's underdevelopment is the existence of Roman 
Catholicism. The Catholic Church is particularly concerned with 
authoritarian rule and the role of the hierarchy in society. 
Unlike Weber's Protestant capitalist, the Catholic has 
continually rejected the concept of individual achievement as 
* I charge that these assumptions, described by the theorists as 
non-political, are themselves quite ideological. Peter Berger 
gladly accepts the ideological label, but most of the other 
theorists consider themselves scientists of society, and basically 
non-ideological. This is a criticism I will develop more fully in 
the next chapter, but I believe that it deserves mention here. 
-having any role in salvation. The Catholic is charged with 
helping the community, placing its interests over individual 
concerns. Therefore, entrepreneurship is castigated if it 
hinders the development of the organic whole. 39 
To prove his point, Lipset contrasts the economic 
development of a nation with dual histories, Canada. Quebec, of 
a French Catholic background, has remained behind Protestant 
British Canada economically. The spirit of capitalism has yet to 
engulf the Quebecers in the same vein as it has their British 
counterparts. This is seen as evidence that Catholicism is not 
wholly conducive to capitalism, which in turn is cited as a 
leading indicator of Latin American underdevelopment. 40 Whether 
this is true or not has yet to be proven. 5 
Finally, both Lipset and Silvert are influenced by the work 
of Talcott Parsons and the concept of pattern-variables. The most 
important of these is the distinction between universalism and 
particularism. This is the distinction between whether a 
society's basic rules are administered universally or on a 
particularistic basis. Universalism suggests that society is 
governed by laws rather than by custom, and that there are no 
rights granted to some groups or individuals but not to the whole 
* I find this example unconvincing given the recent economic 
success of Quebec. But I leave final jUdgement of this example, as 
well as the anti-catholic argument, to you, the reader. The 
question that must be asked is whether Quebec has developed in 
spite of its Catholic history, or if that history is essentially 
irrelevant? How this is answered will illuminate the proper 
pOlicies for Latin American nations. But this particular exercise 
is beyond the scope of this work. 
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of society. Particularism is the opposite of universalism. 
Parsons reasoned that universalism was a necessary prerequisite 
to political and social modernization. 41 
John Johnson has identified the middle sectors of society as 
the most important potential entrepreneurs. Historically, this 
class has been very small and rather weak in political affairs. 
But, through industrialization, there has been as emphasis on the 
development of a capitalist class, as well as a service sector. 
It is with this class that the future of industrialization 
lies. 42 
The Latin American middle class has six distinctive 
features. They are increasingly urban. The rise of urban 
centers have aided in breaking the power of the latifundios and 
have emphasized the need for industrialization. They are 
universalistic in their desire for public education. They are 
nationalistic, which is best exemplified in their support for the 
program for autonomous-capitalist development as expressed 
through the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America 
(ECLA) and its founder, Raul Prebisch. They are anti-Iaissez­
faire, and desire state intervention. Finally, they express 
themselves through the political party, and support civil 
institutions. 43 This means they are unwilling to adopt any 
program designed for them by the more liberal Western economists. 
The rise of the middle sectors, the co-optation of the 
elites within the nation, and the designation of capital for 
economic development were the primary focus of the early 
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modernization theorists. More recently , there has been an 
influx of literature focusing on the need for Third World nations 
to adopt specifically laissez-faire policies for political 
development. It is neither the social nor the economic capacity 
for development that is the focus of this work. It is, instead, 
the presence of state policies promoting capitalism that is the 
primary indicator of economic success. This work is embodied in 
the theorist Peter Berger. 
50 Arguments for Capitalism--Peter Berger 
The newest of the modernization theories have focused almost 
exclusively on the role of the government in the development of 
the Third World economy. The critique has been one mostly on the 
interventionist tendencies of the developing nation. The most 
influential of these critics is Peter Berger, who calls for a, 
more laissez-faire governmental policy throughout the Third 
World. 
Berger believes that developmental governments operate from 
a specific ideological position contradictory to the ideology 
used by the developed world to reach their relative states of 
economic growth. First and foremost is the belief that 
development is more than simple economic growth. It is, 
instead, a call for a more egalitarian distribution of the wealth 
of the nation. Whereas Berger does not deny the need for 
development to involve all sectors of the economy and to improve 
the lives of the entire population, this is not the job of the 
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government. state intervention means economic stagnation. Only 
if the economy is allowed to grow will it become vibrant, and 
then improve the lives of all. Welfare in the Third World brings 
prosperity to none and misery to all but the elite, select 
few. 44 
The second tenet of the Third World ideology is that Third 
World poverty is caused by colonialism and imperialism. The 
focus of Third World theorists is on their colonial past. This 
is a mistake. Instead of developing their own resources, they 
sit on their hands and complain that the West is doing nothing to 
help them out of their state of misery. They need to pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps, so to speak. Therefore, 
instead of developing themselves, they sit and wait for 
compensation for the past. This inherently leads to 
stagnation. 45 
The final tenet of the Third World ideology is that economic 
rights are as important as political rights. Berger finds this 
aspect of human rights discourse dangerous. He believes, as 
Milton Freedman before him, that political rights and economic 
freedom leads to a greater degree of individual autonomy, which 
in turn leads to economic growth. Through economic growth, 
life's basic necessities will be provided. Therefore, only 
through an open economy and a political climate conducive to 
political rights will the nation develop both economically and 
democratically. 46 
state intervention is more than just an impediment to 
-economic growth for Berger. It is, itself, immoral. It wastes 
human resources and creates conditions where people are denied 
life's necessities. It creates a climate for corruption. It 
causes poverty, hunger, and underdevelopment. And, because it is 
socialist in nature, it tramples on the very democratic 
principles which constitute moral government. Therefore, Third 
World nations must cease and desist their interventionist 
~ 
pol icies .47 
Berger states that he uses three criteria to define success 
in economic development. They are: 
1.	 Successful development presupposes sustained and 
self-generating economic growth. 
2.	 Successful development means the large-scale and 
sustained movement of people from a condition of 
degrading poverty to a minimally decent standard of 
living. 
3.	 Development cannot be called successful if the 
achievements of economic growth and equitable 
distribution come at the price of massive 
violations of human rights. 48 
The first point comes directly out of Rostow's "Stages of 
Economic Growth." It describes an economy needing no foreign or 
domestic aid for development. In other words, an economy in 
take-off. The second is the closest Berger comes to populism. 
It is his admittance that the plight of the general population is 
important (although his prescription to battle the problem, as 
detailed above, is antithetical to the developing nation's 
current policies). Finally, he will have nothing to do with the 
bureaucratic-authoritarianism of the South American development 
states, not with Maoist China. There must be respect for human 
-rights for Berger to consider the development legitimate. 
But, he recognizes that the nation may have to be 
authoritarian to implement development policies. The nations of 
the Pacific Rim (including Japan) are prime examples. There need 
not be democracy to develop. But that is not a license for human 
rights abuse. And, a nation must be prepared to democratize as 
one of the final stages of economic and political development. 6 
Modernization theory has been challenged by a number of 
theorists, both in the developed and the developing world. The 
next chapter is devoted to their influence on the literature 
concerning economic development. 
* This is the stage of the current government of South Korea, 
which I will discuss later. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
FROM TRADITIONAL TO DEPENDENT CAPITALIST STATE: DEPENDENCIA 
In the 1960s, immediately following the rise of the 
modernization theories discussed in the previous chapter, a great 
deal of literature challenged the premises of the theories. 
Named IIDependencia" because of the influence of Latin American 
writers, this new body of thought suggested that Third World 
nations break their economic ties with the West. Rather than 
demand more economic aid, they wanted to sever the cord. 
Although Karl Marx's theories of capitalist exploitation were a 
source of inspiration for dependencia, the writings of the 
Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) under the 
directorship of Raul Prebisch were the foundation of this new 
theory's critique of the existing international economic order. 
Raul Prebisch: Structuralism 
Raul Prebisch, a Latin American theorist, conceptually 
divided the global political economy into two groups, the core 
and the periphery. He used this distinction to prove the non­
autonomy of the weaker states in the economic system. The 
nations of the core are the highly developed, industrialized 
nations, while the nations on the periphery are the suppliers of 
raw materials, cheap labor, and markets for the core. Because 
the core produces the necessary finished products for the 
periphery, there is a dependency relationship.49 
This dependency relationship is further strengthened by the 
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international division of labor. The basic premises of the 
problems of the division of labor are rooted in the concept of 
pricing within capitalism. Prices are set in the following 
manner: 
raw materials + labor + transportation + margin of profits = 
price of finished goods 
since the periphery is charged with the production of raw 
materials, while the core produces finished products, this 
division creates structural balance of trade problems. 50 
These balance of trade problems require that the periphery 
produce more and more of their raw materials to purchase finished 
goods. The rise in production drops the price of the raw 
materials, so the problem exists regardless of the policies 
adopted by the government. The balance of trade problems persist 
because the price of the raw materials is necessarily lower than 
that of the finished good. Therefore, there are structural 
problems in the economic order. 51 
Prebisch also argued that free trade is an illusion. The 
developed world is protectionist, while it demands that the 
developing world not protect its infant industry. Therefore, the 
chronic balance of trade problems will necessarily persist, 
because the periphery is not afforded the same opportunity to 
develop that the developed world was (under a mercantilist 
order) .52 
Free trade also requires that foreign investment be allowed 
in each of these Third World nations. This carries with it two 
distinct problems. The first is the capital-intensive technology 
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that follows from foreign investment. There is no spill-over 
effect for the technology transfers and the development projects 
of these multinational corporations. Instead, the investment is 
used for the enhancement of operations. Therefore, the 
infrastructure ties the interior to the ports, while not 
affecting the population centers. 53 
The second problem inherent in foreign investment is that of 
profit repatriation. These multinational corporations are now 
investing their profits in projects to help the company. Nor are 
they investing in indigenous companies. They instead send their 
profits back to their home countries, where they are invested. 
Therefore, there is a multiplier effect, but these effects are 
seen not in the Third World nation, but instead in the developed 
world. 54 
Prebisch, unlike most dependencia theorists, is fully 
capitalist. But unlike the capitalists from the West, he makes a 
distinction between capitalism and free trade as embodied in the 
principles of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). 
He calls for neo-mercantilist policies in the Third World, while 
the core needs to make concessions to allow these nations to 
develop. He used Hamiltonian arguments for protection of infant 
industry, as well as the Japanese experience, to justify his 
model of development. He, therefore, is best seen as a 
reformist, rather than a radical. 
Prebisch's analysis of the problems of the free-trading 
order were highly influential for other dependencia theorists. 
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They have often rejected his call for capitalist development, but 
they use his description of the international trading order as 
evidence in the need for a change. Consequently, he is one of 
the most important of the dependencia theorists. 
Celso Furtado: The International Division of Labor 
Celso Furtado, a Brazilian historian and economist, used a 
number of Prebisch's observations and expanded on them. He 
points to the problem of the international division of labor, and 
how that perpetuates the conditions of underdevelopment and 
dependency in the Third World. 
Furtado sees the Third World as incorporated into the 
capitalist order as producers of raw materials. This means that 
the developing nation is used by the West to provide these 
materials, as well as cheap labor for the production and 
transferral of these materials. This exacerbates the balance of 
trade problems discussed by Prebisch. The consequence is that 
the laborer in the Third World is necessarily exploited by the 
multi-national corporation, for that is the role of the Third 
World laborer in the capitalist order. 55 
Furtado sees Import SUbstitution Industrialization as the 
necessary policy to solve the crisis of the international 
division of labor. Since, as Prebisch so eloquently described, 
the laws of capitalism require that producers of raw materials 
necessarily receive the short end of the trade stick, the Third 
World must begin producing the finished products to solve their 
36 
•
 
balance-of-trade problems. Autonomous capitalist development was 
the answer. The diversification of the Latin American economies 
following the 1929 collapse of the international trading order 
provided empirical evidence supporting the need for ISI. 56 
Andre Gunder Frank: The Development of Underdevelopment 
Another challenge to the modernization order was the 
writings of Andre Gunder Frank. He accepted Prebisch's critique 
of the balance of trade problems inherent in the system, but he 
calls for a more fundamental change in the system. Since 
capitalism is at the root of the problem, the proper response for 
Third World nations is to sever their ties with capitalism and 
build socialism. 
Frank looks specifically at the conditions under which 
colonialism occurred. The European nations incorporated the 
Third World into the capitalist systems by a process of 
exploitation. Mercantilist theory argued that the colony was to 
serve the mother country. Arguments for colonization were racist 
and elitist. Since not even the rhetoric was egalitarian in 
nature, the motives behind colonization were obviously less than 
pure. The colonizers were driven by the desire for a vast share 
of the world's raw materials, cheap labor, and markets for their 
excess goods. In other words, the Third World nations were 
incorporated into the capitalist system to be exploited. 57 
This realization argues that Rostow misinterpreted the 
conditions of the Third World. Although they may have been 
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undeveloped and traditional at one point in their history, they 
are not now. There is a qualitative difference between 
undevelopment and underdevelopment. The former suggests a rather 
isolated society, void of the advances of technology. The latter 
is a condition of exploitation. 58 
Frank also rejects the dual society that Rostow and others 
characterize. The Third World nation is not one where technology 
and economic development have touched one area of the country 
without spill-over. It is developed to supply the developed 
nations with the materials it needs to survive. This is 
evidenced by manner in which the Third World has been developed. 
an example is the highway system of a typical Third World nation. 
There are no roads between major population centers, but 
elaborate transportation systems between export-oriented port 
cities. The infrastructure is not designed to transport people 
throughout the nation. It serves the mUltinational corporation 
which extracts needed material for its operations. The 
multinational represents the developed world's exploitation of 
the Third World. 59 
These cities which house the multinational corporations and 
their export operations are historically situated in the 
dependant nation. They serve an important purpose. Quoting the 
Secretary General on the Latin American Center for Research in 
the Social Sciences, he writes: 
The privileged position of the city has its origin in 
the colonial period. It was founded by the Conqueror 
to serve the same ends that it still serves today; to 
incorporate the indigenous population into the economy 
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brought and developed by that Conqueror and his 
descendants. The regional city was an instrument of 
conquest and is still today an instrument of 
domination. 6o 
In this way, Frank compares the process by which the nations were 
originally incorporated into the capitalist system with the 
continued exploitation at the hands of the rulers of these 
cities, the multinationals. 
Responding to charges that these nations would be 
underdeveloped without the west, but are benefitting from the 
arrangements they have procured with the developed world, Frank 
once again turns his eyes to history. He points out that the 
periods of the highest and most egalitarian rates of growth in 
Latin America was during the Two World Wars and the Great 
Depression. He hypothesizes that this development was due to the 
necessary breaking of ties with the developed world. The nations 
of Latin America were forced to produce that which they had 
previously imported (Import SUbstitution Industrialization), and 
this fueled independent economic development. Several nations 
even became exporters of manufactured goods, thus improving the 
balance of trade problems discussed by Prebisch. 61 
He then looks internationally at a classic example of 
independent economic growth: the example of Meiji Japan. During 
the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese tried to develop themselves 
with as little direct investment from the West as possible. They 
used the same processes as the West, but it was done with both 
Japanese labor and capital. There were no grants given to 
independent investors to develop Japan. Not coincidentallY, this 
39
 
•
 
autonomous development approach was highly successful, and proves 
Frank's point well.~ 
What Frank fails to discuss is that Japan followed 
Prebisch's prescription for autonomous capitalist development, 
not socialism. It adopted the same strategies for development, 
many of the same pOlicies, and even a similar value-system of the 
West. The drive during Meiji, to be sure, was to develop 
autonomously. It was, however, through an almost direct 
emulation of the West that Japan was successful. Frank wants to 
argue that the ideology of development is capitalist in nature. 
His example proves this ideology to be favorable, albeit in a 
different manner than what the modernization theorists postulate. 
Cardoso and Faletto: Populism. Societal Change. and Development 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, two 
contemporaries of Frank, postulated that the internal historical 
steps in the Third World contributed heavily to the process of 
dependency. This period during and following the Second World 
War was a wedding of the elitist political class and the working 
class. This created a dependency relationship by the workers on 
government. The proletariat depended on the government to 
protect it, while the government was actively colluding with the 
capitalist world to enact greater economic development. 
Therefore, the populist regimes were essential in the process of 
co-opting the working class into the dependency relationship.63 
Cardoso and Faletto postulated three distinct ways in which 
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the industrial bourgeoisie, the driving forces behind both 
industrialization and dependency, appears in the different 
nations of the Third World: 
1.	 "Liberal" industrialization directed by private 
entrepreneurial sectors; this required the 
existence of a vigorous and hegemonic agro­
exporting sector that was in some way also linked 
to the domestic market. 
2.	 "National-Populist" industrialization oriented 
politically by the drive of social forces like the 
bourgeoisie, the middle sectors, and the popular 
(trade union) sectors, and linked to the power 
apparatus. Together with the agro-exporting 
sector (even if in conflict with it), these forces 
shared to some extent the direction of the process 
of development. 
3.	 Industrialization oriented by a "developmental 
state," a process in which the weakness of a 
domestic capitalist export-import sector was offset 
by a state program that through a tax system 
channeled investment and established the bases for 
an industrial economy.~ 
The first type of bourgeois is the type required by Rostow 
to realize the pre-conditions for take-off. This industrialist 
is capitalist in that he wishes to increase the profits of his 
agro-exporting economy through the expansion of facilities for 
use in exporting his crops. This is why a hegemonic agro­
exporting economy is necessary. This type of industrialization 
is likely to be capital-intensive, which seldom benefits the 
population at large. It also perpetuates dependency. 
The second type of bourgeois was prevalent in Latin America 
during the period of lSI. They wish to break the hegemony of the 
monocrop economy through the production of manufactured goods, as 
prescribed by Prebisch and Furtado. They will collude with the 
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agricultural giants of the nation, as both see development as 
crucial. In this way, they are partners. They disagree, 
however, in the emphasis of foreign capital. The 
Populist/nationalist is more concerned with indigenous economic 
development than is the liberal. 
The third bourgeois demands the most active role for the 
state in the development of the nation. This is the typical 
*Japanese person. Tax incentives for development are essential 
in the third prescription for development. Dependency is 
enhanced, however, by the "development at all cost" ideology, as 
well as foreign companies who take advantage of the tax breaks. 
These nations often find themselves dominated by foreign capital 
investment, which exacerbates the problem of profit repatriation 
as discussed by Prebisch. 
Which of these paths the nation takes seems of little 
importance as to the quantitative measures of dependency, 
although they may affect the qualitative measures. The important 
point is that all three lead to dependency, unless steps are 
taken to protect the economy. Cardoso and Faletto, like many of 
the Dependencia theorists, disagree with Frank and his call for 
socialism. They believe, like Prebisch, that autonomous 
capitalism is the best policy for Third World economic 
development. 
A completely different critique is that of Cheryl Payer, who 
* What makes the Third World different is that most of these 
nations are not as insistent or efficient in keeping out foreign 
investment or products from their markets. 
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sees the developed nations working together to set a "debt trap," 
in which the Third World often falls. 
Cheryl Payer: The Debt Trap 
Payer focuses her critique of the mOdernization theory on 
the question of external debt. These Third World nations are 
extended loan money for the purposes of development and the 
stabilization of their currencies. The former is done through 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, 
or World bank) and the latter through the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The loans become burdensome on these nation's 
economies, and a source of control by the capitalist states. 65 
These institutions are argued by the West to be non­
ideological, technocratic institutions, but Payer sees them 
otherwise. They are both headquartered in Washington D.C., and 
will always have a Western policymaking body. The pOlicies of 
the united states et al are almost always consistent with the 
policies of these institutions. A prime example is the IMF's 
refusal to extend needed financial aid to Allende's Chile in the 
early 1970s. This money was refused because the Nixon 
Administration opposed Allende's designs for nationalizing 
Chile's strategic industries. The lack of funds were 
instrumental in the overthrow of the Allende government in 1973. 
This is prima facie evidence that the Western nations use these 
institutions as policy instruments.~ 
The general trend of these institutions is to extend loan 
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money for huge projects. When these projects are completed, the 
government is required to service this debt, at high interest 
rates. To service the debt, the government must take out further 
loans. The principle of the initial loans accumulate. Servicing 
becomes unbearable, and the national economy begins to experience 
"chronic structural problems." When loans become excessively 
burdensome, the government must adopt the IMF's stabilization 
model, or what Payer calls an "austerity program." 
This is the West moving in for the kill. The austerity 
program is designed to exploit the Third World country at its 
moment of weakness. The currency is devalued and foreign 
investment is encouraged. This new competition destroys the 
infant industries designed to sUbstitute imports from the West. 
In addition, all trade barriers are lowered, and state subsidies 
are cut off. State-run corporations are sold off, often to 
foreign speculators. At the very moment when the economy is at 
its weakest, the West begins buying huge portions. To use 
Payer's own term, the country has fallen in the debt trap.67 
The dependencia theory is a fundamental challenge to the 
modernization theorists' tenet that underdevelopment is caused 
internally. External policies of economic doniantion through 
imperialism is the cause of underdevelopment. Obviously, 
theoretical challenges must be analyzed empiracally if they are 
to be considered valid. Therefore, what follows is a study of 
two countries, both of whom have experienced high growth rates. 
will try to put these two nations in theoretical perspective. I 
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Chapter 3:
 
From Traditional to Modern Economy: South Korea
 
For many Americans, Korea elicits memories of a war long­
since forgotten. Older Americans remember sending loved ones to 
a faraway country about which the population knew nothing. 
Younger Americans are drawn to the television series "MASH" and 
remember a nation described as agriculturally-based and 
economically undeveloped. In the 1950s, Korea seemed an unlikely 
candidate for rapid industrialization. It stands, however, as 
one of the success stories of the modernization theorists: a 
testament to foreign aid contributing significantly to economic 
development. What follows is an attempt to understand the 
processes by which Korea developed, the nature of these 
successes, and perhaps a glimpse into what the future holds for 
this, the largest of the "Four Tigers." 
A Nation Called Korea 
Korea sits on a peninsula between three great powers in East 
Asia: Japan, China, and the Soviet union. Only one-fourth of 
its land is cultivable, with most of the land being mountainous. 
It is approximately the size of Portugal, and just a quater of 
the size of either California or Japan.~ The total area of the 
peninsula is 220,000 square kilometers. 69 Sitting between 
these three powers, Korea has been sUbject to countless attempts 
to try and control it, both internally and externally. It has 
been a colony of China and, most recently, Japan. Because of its 
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Table 1 
specific Data on Korea 
GNP avg. ann. life 
Population Area per capita growth expectancy 
1977 36.0 99 670 7.3 nja 
1979 36.0 820 7.4 63 
1981 37.8 1480 7.1 63 
1985 40.0 2010 6.7 67 
1987 41.1 2150 6.6 69 
1989 42.1 2690 6.4 69 
source: World Development Report7O 
lack of resources, it has historically been dependent on its 
neighbors. This dependence has sUbjugated Korea to the whims of 
its more powerful neighbors. Like Japan, Korea is not self-
sustaining. Its lack of resources and its relatively small size 
has lent itself to foreign domination. Therefore, an analysis of 
Korea's history is essential to understanding its evolution into 
the modern economy that now sits on the peninsula. 
Historical Developments 
Isolation and Chinese Dominance 
The history of Korea is a history of dependence on one power 
or another. First China and then Japan dominated the Korean 
peninsula. Korea was also developed as regionally dependant; 
that is to say, the South was dependant on the North, and vice 
versa. The South was primarily agriculturally-based, while the 
North had all of the industry. Therefore, with the bisection of 
Korea in 1945, each region was necessarily dependant on its 
sponsor (the Soviet union in the North and the united States in 
the South) for much of its necessities. 71 
Korean history can be broken down into the following stages: 
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Table 2 
The Historic Development of Korea 
I. The Yi (Chosun) Dynasty (14th Century-1876) 
l. Centralized state 
2. Chinese colony 
II. The Opening of Korea (1876-1910) 
l. First Encroachments from the West 
2 . Treaty system 
3. First Sino-Japanese War 
4. Russo-Japanese War 
III. Japanese Colonization (1910-1945) 
1. Period of Agricultural Development 
2. Period of Industrial Growth 
3. World War II 
IV. Post-War Civilian Rule (1945-1960) 
1. American Military Government 
2. The New Republic 
3. The Korean War 
4. Post-war autocratic rule 
V. Military Government (1961-1980s) 
1. Repressive military regime 
2. Period of liberalization
 
source: compiled by the author72
 
In the latter part of the 14th Century, the general Yi Taejo 
seized control of the peninsula, and founded the Yi Dynasty at 
Seoul. Yi was supported by the Chinese, which made Korea a 
vassal state (under the Confucian principle of the hierarchy of 
nations). Since that time, Korea, like most of East Asia, was 
governed under a centralized system based on Confucian 
principles. Confucius dictated that the world was based on 
superior/inferior relationships. One of these associations was 
that between the ruler and his subjects. In these relationships, 
the superior demanded absolute obedience, but was expected to 
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grant absolute benevolence. Therefore, the ruler had complete 
control over his kingdom, which required centralized government 
and a large, effective bureaucracy.n 
In the mid-19th Century, the kingdom (coined by Paul Kuznets 
as the "Hermit Kingdom") 74 showed signs of decay. Korea had 
been closed off from outside influences, much like the Tokegawa 
Shogunate in Japan at the same time. After Perry's successful 
opening of Japan in 1854, the west turned its eyes to the Korean 
peninsula. Korea initially objected, and responded accordingly. 
In 1866, an American ship the General Sherman, was burned and its 
crew killed near Pyongyang. In 1871, the united States was once 
again defeated by the Koreans in a naval battle at the mouth of 
the Han river. Finally, in 1875, Japan forcibly opened Korea and 
signs a commerce treaty with the peninsula in February, 1876. 
Though still a vassal nation to China, Korea was officially 
recognized as independent.~ 
Colony and Japanese Domination 
Chinese dominance over the peninsula continued until 1894, 
when a rebellion in Seoul erupted. Called "Tonghak" (Eastern 
Learning), this rebellion demanded that closer ties be initiated 
with Japan.* Both Japan and China send troops to "help the 
government on Seoul," and the first Sino-Japanese War was the 
result. The Japanese routed the Chinese, and by 1895 had 
* This was done for a number of reasons, most importantly 
because of Japan's success and China's failure to deal with the 
West on a somewhat equal footing. 
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defeated her larger neighbor. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
China recognizes Korea's independence and Japan's sphere of 
influence over the peninsula.~ This would begin 50 years of 
Japanese dominance over Korea. 
Russia's response to the Treaty of Shimonoseki was to 
encroach on Japanese hegemony in Korea. Therefore, when Japan 
and Russia go to war in 1904, Korea was a major issue. After the 
Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent 
Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese established complete hegemony 
over the Korean Peninsula. In 1905, Korea became an official 
colony of Japan. After 5 years of preparation, Japan forced 
Korea completely under its control. On August 22, 1910, Japan 
annexed Korea. 77 
The Colonial Period was very difficult on the Korean people. 
The Japanese used Korea as a resource for rice cUltivation and 
other raw materials, but allowed little or no industrialization 
to take place. The Japanese first seized the land from wealthy 
Koreans and redistributed based on loyalty to the Japanese. This 
was done under the auspices of the Oriental Development Company. 
This period of agricultural domination and development was also 
marked by severe internal security measures adopted by the 
Japanese colonial government. The final characteristic of the 
colonial period was the Chosen Company Regulations (corporation 
Law), which limited non-agricultural investment in Korea.~ 
In 1931, the world began embargoing necessary materials for 
Japanese industrialization. The effects of the embargo became 
Table 3.1 
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Volume, Distribution,	 and Relative Importance of Foreign Trade 
1910-12 to 1939-41 
Volume percent distribution 
(million yen) exports to: 
Japan China others 
period 
1910-12a 380.1 73.7 16.8 9.5 
1914-16a 567.4 79.9 13.0 7.1 
1919-21a 961. 6 89.9 8.8 1.3 
1924-26a 1593.3 93.1 6.6 0.3 
1929-31a 2073.5 91.4 8.2 0.4 
1934-36a 3813.6 87.7 11. 6 0.7 
1939-41a 4174.4 77.4 21.2 0.4 
source: Suh sang-chul79 
a= yearly average 
Table 3.2 
Volume, Distribution,	 and Relative Importance of Foreign Trade 
1910-12 to 1939-41 
percent distribution 
Imports from Trade 
Japan China others Ratios 
1910-12a 62.4 10.1 27.5 13.8 
1914-16a 67.5 12.9 19.6 17.6 
1919-21a 64.4 23.7 11.9 28.7 
1924-26a 68.0 24.3 7.7 39.9 
1929-31a 76.5 15.9 7.6 51. 7 
1934-36a 84.8 10.8 4.4 57.2 
1939-41a 88.3 4.8 6.9 53.5 
source: Suh Sang-chul80 
a= yearly average 
note: the trade ratio = exports + imports 
commodity product + imports 
more pronounced following the Manchurian incident of 1931. The 
embargo, coupled with	 the collapse of the international trading 
order of 1929, compelled the Japanese to repeal the Corporation 
Law. This policy fueled industrial growth in Korea, which was 
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sent to Japan to boost the Japanese war machine. Government 
intervention, most evident in its preparations for war, marked 
this middle period of colonization. 81 Korea was beginning to 
break its dependence on agriculture and significantly diversify 
the economy. 
The period of 1942-45 is one of economic disruption, about 
which the West knows little. Japan obviously tried to squeeze 
Korea for whatever it could to fuel the war effort, and this 
period was understandably hard on the Koreans. The specific 
pOlicies of the Japanese vis-a-vis the Koreans, however, is 
unknown. The Japanese were quite effective at destroying any 
incrinimating evidence compiled during the war. 82 
Korea's volume of foreign trade increased sUbstantially 
during the period of industrialization. As Table 3 shows, the 
volume of international trade increased dramatically during 
colonization, while the percentage of trade with the Japanese 
also increased dramatically. The increases in trade with China 
following 1931 shows the Japanese policy of integrating its newly 
acquired Chinese territory into the Japanese empire. Finally, 
the level of exports from Korea to Japan was historically higher 
than the imports from Japan to Korea.~ This is a sign that 
Japan practiced an orthodox colonial policy toward Korea, milking 
its economy while reinvesting little. Korea's dependence on the 
world became even more pronounced. 
Democracy and Post-War Independence 
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The end of the war through its defeat of Japan brought 
independence to Korea. The nation found itself divided, and a 
victim of the oncoming Cold War. The united states occupied the 
Southern Half of Korea, while the Soviet Union occupied the 
northern half. From 1945-48, the united States ruled Korea, and 
supplied money for economic necessities through the Government 
and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program. During this time, 
over $400 million flowed into (now) South Korea, with over 90% of 
the aid coming in the form of food, fertilizer, clothing, fuel, 
and other commodities.~ The united States was hoping to avoid 
the disaster of a famine, but showed little interest in funding 
economic development. 
The New Republic was formed following the American 
withdrawal in 1948. As L.L. Wade and B.S. Kim have described, 
"During the New Republic, power was allocated primarily to the 
Assembly, while the political culture continued to rest upon the 
persistent authoritarianism of the past."~ In other words, 
although there was formal democracy, an autocratic tendency 
dominated Korean political life. A civilian government under 
Syngman Rhee ruled Korea. Rhee emphasized internal security, and 
ruled as a absolute autocrat. Provisions for repressions were 
outlined in the National Security Law.~ As a result, guerrilla 
activity was wide-spread on the eve of the Korean War. In 
these three years prior to the Korean War, the u.S. gave Korea 
$350 million in aid through GARIOA. This was designed to cover 
the cost of importing fertilizer, food, and industrial raw 
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materials for the industrialization promised by Rhee during his 
campaign for the Presidency. Again, the United states had a 
notion of nascent economic development, but had yet to devise a 
comprehensive development plan for Korea. Much of this aid was 
poured into the military following the security threat from the 
North. 87 
The Korean War was devastating to the economy of Korea. 
Property damage in the South equalled the entire GNP for the year 
1953. Aid to Korea was sent through a number of agencies, 
including the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) 
and the American Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK).~ 
The period of 1953-61 can be best characterized by the 
personal dictatorship of Rhee. The bureaucracy was never 
developed by Rhee, because of his autocratic policies. Much of 
the aid money sent to Korea was invested in pet projects favored 
by Rhee, and corruption ran rampant. Internal security measures 
were strengthened, as the President appeared far more interested 
in maintaining power than in building a viable economy. Foreign 
investment fueled whatever growth Korea accomplished during this 
period, and it was far from self-sustaining. 89 
In 1960, Rhee faced challenges to the legitimacy of his 
government. On April 6, a student-led uprising rocked Korea. 
The government responded harshly to the uprising, killing 130 and 
wounding over 1,000. Rhee's popularity plunged, and on April 26, 
he was exiled in Hawaii. His successor instituted the Second 
Republic, which was overthrown by military coup less than a year 
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later. By May, 1961, a military government was installed, with 
Park Chung-Hee as the President. 90 
Military Government and Rapid Economic Growth 
The military government adopted an ideology of economic 
growth at all costs. The government took an active role in 
economic planning, as evidenced by the five Five-Year plans 
instituted by the Korean government since the early 1960s. The 
land was conceptually (and later administratively, in 1972 under 
the National Land Development Act) into regions. The most 
important of these regions were Seoul and Pusan. Seoul's 
proximity to the North caused security problems, as it was 
continually under threat of shelling from North Korea. It 
nevertheless continues to dominate the Korean economy. In later 
years, the government encouraged development of the far 
Southeastern corner of Pusan, and has been relatively successful. 
The bulk of the population remains, however, centered in Seoul. 
In 1962, the government instituted the first Five-Year Plan. To 
fuel economic growth, Korea normalized relations with Japan in 
1965. This provided the nation with cheaper materials, more 
abundant capital, and more available markets. The first Five­
Year plan brought export-oriented industrial growth, and trade 
with the united States flourished. But, the growth was also 
accompanied by high social costs, which will be discussed later 
in the chapter. 91 
As stated before, the Korean economy operated with a vast 
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degree of government control. In 1972, the government instituted 
the National Land Development Plan, which divided the whole 
country into the four "Large development or river basin regions. 1I 
Each of these regions was further subdivided into eight major 
regions. The most important of these regions, as stated before, 
was Seoul and Pusan-Kyongman. Together, the two regions contain 
over 50% of the Korean population. The drive for the Korean 
government was to relocate the locus of its economy and its 
population away from the security-threatened region of Seoul and 
into the safe Southeastern corner. 
In 1970, Korea was officially designated as a Newly 
Industrializing Country (NIC). In the 1980s, the government 
shifted from an official policy of growth at any cost to growth 
with stability. This is what Rostow calls the drive to maturity. 
Korea is now focusing on providing social welfare for its 
population, and paying off the huge debt it accumulated during 
the high-growth period of the 60s and 70s. It stands on the 
brink of success. 
Economic Growth and the Miracle on the Han 
The type of growth desired by the military government was 
export-oriented industrial growth. They wanted to wean the 
economy away from rice production and emulate the success of the 
Japanese. This would resolve the balance of trade and payments 
problems that persist in the Third World, as well as spin-off to 
improve the lives of the general population. 
As tables 4 and 5 show, the Korean economy no longer 
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Table 4 
Average Annual Growth Rates 
GDP Agricul. Industry Manufact. Services 
1965 8.5 4.5 17.2 17.2 8.4 
1977 10.4 5.0 17.0 19.3 8.5 
1979 10.3 4.8 17.1 n/a 8.6 
1981 10.3 4.8 16.5 17.8 8.8 
1985 7.3 1.5 11.2 11.8 6.9 
1987 7.9 6.3 9.6 9.0 6.7 
1989 8.6 4.4 10.8 10.6 7.7 
source: World Development Report92 
Table 5 
Distribution of GDP 
Agricult. Industry Manufacturing Services 
1960 40 19 12 41 
1965 38 25 18 36 
1977 27 35 25 38 
1979 27 34 n/a 39 
1981 20 39 27 41 
1985 14 39 27 47 
1987 14 41 28 45 
1989 11 43 30 46 
source: World Development Report93 
note: % of GDP accounted to manufacturing is a part of % of the 
GDP accounted to industry. 
stressed agriculture by the late 1970s. Whereas agriculture 
accounted for 40% of the Korean GDP in 1960, it accounted for a 
mere 11% in 1989. This suggests that the government was 
successful in weaning the economy off rice production and mining 
and onto a more diversified economy. The essentially constant 
GDP growth rates, and the lack of significant influence anyone 
sector had on general GDP growth rate for the last 14 years also 
suggests a more diversified economy. So, in its stated 
intentions, the Korean government was successful. It appears 
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that Korea is now situated on the semi-periphery, and has already 
passed through Rostow's take-off stage. 
Rostow and the Korean Economy 
Rostow has described the period of 1961-68 as the period of 
the take-off for the Korean economy. Unlike the usual 40 years 
it took other economies to fully accomplish take-off, Korea's 
high growth rate period was very short. Rostow points to the 
following factors as instrumental in this short take-off period: 
(a)	 the adoption of a sound-growth strategy, 
(b)	 the development of growth-promoting institutions 
and pUblic policies, 
(c)	 high quality workers and entrepreneurs, 
(d)	 a technological backlog available to Korea as a 
latecomer, 
(e)	 proper use of pUblic resources for infrastructure 
development and education, 
(f)	 population control, 
(g)	 the capacity of entrepreneurs and policymakers of 
the "intellectual trap" -- the assumption that an 
economy can be managed adequately using only such 
macroeconomic tools as the regulation of money 
supply, interest rates and so on. 94 
Many of these factors suggest a management-oriented role for the 
government. The adoption of a sound-growth strategy seems wrong­
headed, for although the government did adopt a policy of 
managing growth, inflation persisted as a problem. This will be 
analyzed in the next section. The development of growth-
promoting institutions and pUblic pOlicies and the proper use of 
public resources are both governmental management questions. the 
role of education has been called the "New Confucian Ethic," 
which will be discussed later. Population control and the 
"intellectual trap" are also government policies. So. in 
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contrast to Berger's call for more laissez-faire economic 
policies, it seems the success of Korea has been in more 
government intervention. 
Government Intervention and the Korean Economy 
The government intervention, however, has been accomplished 
through more emphasis on local ventures. Rather than create 
large, state-centric corporation, the Korean government has 
assumed the role of a supporting actor to the economy, but an 
important one nevertheless. Unlike the pOlicies of the united 
states (or those prescribed by Peter Berger), the Korean 
government has not completely withdrawn from economic affairs. 
It does not practice laissez-faire economic policies. Instead, 
it takes a very active role by providing capital for the purposes 
of investment, while allowing private entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of the governmental policies. In this way, it more 
closely follows the Japanese model of capitalism, rather than the 
American model. Therefore, Korea stands as proof that it is not 
government intervention per se that inhibits economic growth. 
There are other factors that enter into the equation. 
As Table 7 shows, the Korean government's intervention into 
the economy grew throughout the period of high growth rates. The 
number of pUblic enterprises stabilized in 1970, but the value 
added to the economy has risen exponentially in the last 25 
years. From a modest investment of 21.6 billion won in 1963, the 
pUblic enterprises invested nearly 4 trillion won in 1986. 
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Table 6 
The status of Korean Public Enterprises, 1988 
TYPE NUMBER OF EMPLOYMENT ASSETS SALES 
ENTERPRISES ( 1000) (trillion won) 
a-government 
enterprises 4 73.4 9.51 2.68 
b-government­
invested 
enterprises 26 160.4 55.97 10.10 
c-subsidiary 
companies of 
GIEs 67 75.2 8.02 5.82 
d-other govern­
ment-backed 
enterprises 6 31.1 27.93 3.95 
e-local public 
enterprises 119 25.1 5.35 0.47 
f-Total 222 365.3 106.78 23.02 
source: Dae-hee song95 
GIE=government invested enterprise 
Table 7 
The Public Enterprise Sector 
Number of 
enterprises 
1963 
52 
1970 
119 
1975 
116 
1980 
111 
1986 
107 
Sectoral value-
added (billion won) 
% of GDP 
31.8 
7.0 
262.1 
9.2 
848.5 
8.3 
6680.0 
9.1 
6859.0 
9.1 
Sectoral employment 
in thousands 
% of total employment 
280 
1.9 
341.9 
2.0 
Sectoral Investment 
billion won 21.6 216.3 
% total investment 31.7 18.9 
source: Leroy P. Jones and II Sak
19861 Kang Shin-iI, 1988, 
918.6 
33.2 
ong, 1980, 
and Kwack 
3253.7 
27.6 
Song Dae-hee, 
Soo-il, 
3897.3 
15.6 
1988"'6 
Although the actual percentage of investment has decreased, the 
amount of investment has risen sharply in the last 10 years. 
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This suggests that the government should take an active role in 
developing the economy, but may be able to back off after a 
period of substantial growth. 
Finally, it must be stated that the Korean government 
conceived of itself as a partner to the leading firms in the 
national economy. This is the same economic ideology that Japan 
follows. This should not be surprising, considering that Korea 
was initially developed by Japan and is similar culturally. Both 
nations are prone to social consensus, and both have experienced 
high growth in the very recent future. Not surprisingly, both 
are affected by what Song Byung-Nak calls the "New Confucian 
Ethic." 
The New Confucian Ethic 
The impact of Max Weber's The Rise of Protestantism and the 
Spirit of Capitalism has caused many Westerners to seek similar 
traits among East Asian people. Modernization theorists look to 
cultural explanations as to why the "Four Tigers" have been so 
successful at attaining economic grwoth and development. This 
searching has lead to the postulation of a "New Confucian Ethic." 
This New Confucian Ethic is charcterized first and foremost 
by an emphasis on education. Dating back thousands of years, the 
followers of Confucius have sought the "best and the brightest" 
to manage the affairs of the nation. They have emphasized 
universal access to education, It is not uncommon for parents to 
sacrifice worldly pleasures to allow their children to continue 
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Table 8 
Education 
% enrolled in education 
primary secondary tertiary 
total male female total male female 
1960 94 99 89 27 nja nja 5 
1965 99 100 99 35 44 25 6 
1977 100 100 100 63 nja nja 10 
1979 100 100 100 59 nja nja 10 
1981 100 100 100 74 nja nja 11 
1985 100 100 100 89 nja nja 24 
1987 100 100 100 91 94 88 26 
1989 100 100 100 95 98 93 33 
source: World Development Report97 
their education. In the united states, the motivation would be a 
parental personal fulfillment through the success of the 
children. In the Confucian nation, the personal fulfillment is 
through the success of the nation. This is why the Koreans, as 
well as the other nations of East Asia, are so driven to 
excellence in education.~ 
As table 6 shows, even as early as 1960, Koreans were 
attending school on a regular basis. The percentage of the 
population in secondary and tertiary education increased 
sUbstantially in the last 15 years. This is a sign that Korea 
emphasizes education as the cornerstone of the economy. 
The second tenet of the new Confucian Ethic is the desire 
for leadership from the government. Rather than desire limited 
government through a Bill of Rights and laissez-faire economic 
policies, Confucians desire leadership from the government. This 
dates back to the superiorjinferior relationships Confucius 
identified, with one of the fundamentals being that between the 
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ruler and the ruled. The close relational aspect between 
government and the economy explains the significant role both the 
Korean and the Japanese Ministries of Trade and Industry play in 
the economy. Many theorists believe this gives East Asian 
nations an edge in economic affairs. w 
The third tenet of Confucianism is the desire for consensus. 
Neither the Japanese nor the Koreans are particularly interested 
in conflict. This is what the Japanese call "kogi." Personal 
interests should be purged for the interests of the community. 
Again, this explains why the Korean people accept a repressive 
regime, but one that fosters economic growth.· The growth is 
for the good of the nation, so the individual should not object 
to a lack of political liberties. 1OO This is why there are so 
few labor strikes in Korea and Japan, and so coincidentally so 
few periods of low growth. 
Finally, the New Confucian Ethic fosters the kind of 
entrepreneurial spirit which fosters economic growth. All labor 
should be directed for the state, which takes an active role in 
the management of the economy. 101 The ethic rewards hard work 
through the personal satisfaction of experiencing national 
success. This rivals the Protestant work ethic in that both 
drive a person to labor, but is healthier because personal 
satisfaction is not connected with personal economic success. In 
• This hypothesis falls flat in the face of the recent 
student demonstrations in South Korea, but remains central to the 
concept of the New Confucian Ethic. Perhaps Korea is simply not as 
successful at fostering this aspect of the ethic as is Japan. 
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other words, Protestantism is individualistic, while Confucianism 
is other-seeking. Welfare is built into a system without 
government intervention.* 
High Growth Rates, Inflation, and the Social Costs 
High growth is generally accompanied by high inflation. The 
military government did little the arrest the high inflation. 
Its policy of growth at all costs forced the population to suffer 
the consequences of the inflation. Song Byung-Nak has identified 
four major consequences. First of all, the inflation 
redistributed wealth from creditors to debtors. This was because 
the interest rates could not keep pace with the inflation, so 
loans were cheap. This ran against the Koreans' sense of 
justice. They saw the creditors as being small entrepreneurs. 
The debtors were large conglomerates. Therefore, inflation had a 
reverse Robin Hood effect: it stole from the poor to give to the 
rich. The number of political scandals during the period of 
inflation was proof that the rich were getting richer and the 
poor were getting poorer. 102 
The second effect high interest rates had was that it caused 
negative real interest rates. What this means is that, because 
of the banking industry's inability to adjust interest rates to 
keep up with the inflation, the interest accumulated on savings 
* Of course, this is not always the case. One need only 
study the retirement practices of the Japanese to be alarmed at the 
need for national welfare, but, in theory, it should be present on 
a personal level. 
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was not equal to the value of the money in real terms. Quite 
simply, money was worth less when it was put in savings accounts. 
This created a crisis of confidence throughout the Korean 
population in the financial institutions.1~ 
Not surprisingly, Koreans began investing their resources in 
markets other than financial institutions. The most popular 
market was in real estate. Land held its value, and was always a 
valuable commodity. Considering the density of the Korean 
population, land was an even more valuable commodity. This money 
was unavailable for use by industry for capital investment. The 
inflation was the driving force behind the relatively low savings 
rate in Korea until 1985 (not coincidentally, only three years 
after the government took steps to arrest the inflation). 104 
This problem was called a lack of "the entrepreneurial spirit" by 
Shumpeter and "the problem of hoarding" by Rostow, as highlighted 
in Chapter 1. 
The fourth and final problem of the inflation was that it 
contributed to the expansion of an underground, unorganized 
credit market. This market reached about half the size of the 
organized market in the late 1960s. Imagine the impact on an 
economy where half of the loans extended were underground, with 
no regulation as to the collection or to the interest rates 
charged. This was the case in Korea in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and the problem was alleviated only through the anti­
inflationary steps of the government in 1982. 105 
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Foreign Investment, Debt and the Korean Economy 
In the same manner as many Third World nations, the economic 
growth experienced in Korea was a result of a heavy influx of 
foreign capital into that nation. Following the Korean War, 
money from the Point Four program flowed into Korea in greater 
sums than of other nations. This was a cognizant effort by the 
United states to help develop the nation so it was more advanced 
economically than its communist neighbor to the north. 
Therefore, foreign capital played an important role in the 
development of the Korean economy, and will continue to playa 
role in the performance of the economy in the future. 
As table 7 shows, the debt owed by Korea is far greater now 
than even 15 years ago. The percentage of GNP and exports that 
will service the debt is far greater now than before. In 
1977, the percentage of GNP that services the debt was a mere, 
3.7% For 1989, that percentage leapt to 13.0%. The percentage 
of exports needed for debt servicing is even more drastic. A 
mere 9.7% in 1976, the percentage of export earnings required to 
serve the debt in 1989 was a whopping 27.5%. And the trend is 
not favorable. 
Contrary to the populat belief among modernization 
theorists, this condition of debt is not a natural or historic 
stage of economic growth. It is the result of the policies of 
the governments of both South Korea and the united States (and 
her allies) in the 1960s and 70s. In the name of fighting 
communism (by improving the lot of the poor), these two nations 
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Table 9 
Debt Service Ratios 
(in millions) 
Interest Debt service as a percentage of 
GNP Exports 
1962-66a 29 n/a n/a 
1967-71a 534 n/a 16.4 
1972 326 n/a 20.1 
1973 419 n/a 13.0 
1974 490 n/a 11. 0 
1975 555 n/a 10.9 
1976 752 n/a 9.7 
1977 987 3.7 9.8 
1978 1446 n/a 11.4 
1979 1911 4.8 12.9 
1981 1937 4.4 13.5 
1985 1744 n/a 12.3 
1987 2151 6.1 15.2 
1989 2375 13.0 27.5 
source: Compiled by author'06 
a= yearly average 
have put Korea in a huge debt. It did foster economic growth, 
but at what price? From a mere 29 million dollars in the 1960s, 
the interest payments on the debt alone ran over 2 billion 
dollars for 1989. And, as stated above, the trend is not 
favorable. Fortunately, Korea has been able to escape the debt 
cycle under which many nations fall; that is, increasing the 
principal of the national debt to service past debt. The 
economic growth must continue, however, if Korea is to avoid the 
cycle. This is high-risk policy. 
The consequence of the debt is that it will tie up needed 
funds to help the less fortunate. In other words, the fruits of 
success will not go to the population, but to the nations and 
private investors who lent money to Korea in the 1960s and 70s. 
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Korea appears able to pay this debt, but the economic growth 
must last. Barring any unforeseen shocks to the economy, Korea 
should be able to successfully service its debt. Unfortunately, 
it will require substantial resource that could be used for other 
ventures. It could be used to further subsidize further 
development of the infrastructure (telephones are a relatively 
recent luxury afforded the common Korean citizen). Or, it could 
be used to develop more efficient export-oriented industry to 
further the balance-of-trade surplus. Or, it could be used to 
help provide shelter for the homeless and food for the hungry. 
It will be used, however, to payoff the investors in the Korean 
"Miracle on the Han." Hopefully, Korea will be able to avoid the 
problems the Brazilian economy has seen, the focus of the next 
chapter. In any case, its dependency on Western financial 
institutions is well-established, and its prosperity depends on 
the prosperity of the West. That is evidence of the "debt trap," 
a perhaps inevitable consequence of modernization theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Brazil: From Take-off to Forced Landing 
Brazil, dominating the South American continent, stands as 
one of the most impressive success stories gone awry. Once 
hailed as the "Brazilian Miracle," it now is failing under a huge 
amount of debt. Inflation runs wild, and unemployment stands in 
the way of true development. What follows is an attempt to 
understand how this condition came to pass, and perhaps a hint at 
correcting the economic decline of Brazil. 
A Nation Called Brazil 
Brazil sits on the Eastern coast of South America, with a 
land-mass surpassing one-half of that continent. It is the fifth 
largest nation in the world with respect to area. It has a huge 
population, and has suffered some of the population problems 
which are symptomatic of many Third World nations. It has 
experienced some economic growth, and ranks eighth in terms of 
total exports throughout the world. But it has a dual economy, 
which places it among the semi-periphery nations, using Immanuel 
Wallerstein's characterizations under the world systems 
theory. 107 The secret to understanding Brazil's economic 
story lies in its history. The pOlicies adopted by each 
successive government illustrate the dependant nature by which 
Brazil was incorporated into the global political economy. The 
conditions also explain the lack of economic success which has 
plagued Brazil since cOlonization. Perhaps the most appropriate 
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Table 10 
Specific Data on Brazil 
Population Area	 GNP per avg. ann. life 
capita growth expectancy 
1977 110.0 8512 1140 4.8 n/a 
1979 116.1 1360 4.9 62 
1981 116.5 1780 4.8 63 
1985 129.7 1880 5.0 64 
1987 135.6 1640 4.3 65 
1989 141.4 2020 4.1 65 
source: World Development Report108 
manner to analyze these conditions is through a historical 
analysis of Brazil's economy, as it is tied to political 
considerations. It is	 under this premise that I proceed. 
Historical Developments 
Brazil, like most nations, has experienced a number of 
historical phases. These phases define the development of a 
nation, and together form the whole of history. Brazil's 
historical development, as well as its economic conditions, can 
be broken down into the following periods of governmental rule: 
Table 11 
Historical Development of Brazil 
I. Colonial Period, 1500-1822 
1. Rule from Lisbon, 1500-1808 
2. Rule from Rio de Janeiro, 1808-22 
II. Empire, 1822-89 
1. Pedro I, 1822-31 
2. Regency, 1831-40 
3. Pedro II, 1840-49 
III. Old Republic, 1889-1930 
1. Military/civilian oligarchy, 1889-98 
2. Cafe com Leite, 1889-1930 
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IV. Transition Republic (The Vargas Era), 1930-45
 
1.	 Provisional government, 1930-34
 
2.	 Constitutional government, 1934-37
 
3.	 Estado Novo (dictatorship), 1937-45
 
V. Democratic Republic, 1946-64
 
1.	 Presidential government, 1946-61
 
2.	 Parliamentary government, 1961-63
 
3.	 Presidential government, 1963-64
 
VI. Military Government, 1964-85
 
1.	 Controlled Government, 1964-68
 
2.	 Authoritarian government, 1968-79
 
3.	 Liberalizing authoritarian government, 1979­

85
 
VII. Post-Military Constitutionalism, 1985-present 
1.	 Transitional government, 1985-90
 
2. Constitutional government, 1990-present
 
source: compiled by the author109
 
Colonization and Development 
Brazil was developed as a colony as a dependant nation. It 
was seen as a cog in the Portuguese empire following the early 
settlement of the region in the mid-1550s. The first settlement 
was founded in 1530, at Sao Vincente (near present-day Sao 
PaUlo). The Portuguese crown had difficulty convincing its 
sUbjects to settle the new colony, as natives and diseases struck 
the earliest settlers. To induce colonization, the crown created 
15 somewhat autonomous captaincies, of which two were successful. 
Finally, in 1549, the crown centralized authority in the newly 
created capital of Bahia, in the present-day province of 
Salvador. 110 
The first export from Brazil was a colored dye made from 
brazilwood (hence, the name of the country). Eventually, the 
Portuguese learned to make this dye from indigo, which was a less 
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costly product that could be more easily harvested. Settlers in 
Brazil then began growing sugar in the northeast. Coffee was 
later cultivated in the land around Sao Paulo. These crops 
demanded large harvests, for the commodity itself was of little 
value unless produced in bulk. This reality fueled a labor 
shortage, which was alleviated by the introduction of the slave 
trade, in the 17th century. 111 
Crop cultivation was hurt by the discovery of gold in the 
Minas Gerais area in 1695. Farmers from throughout the nation 
left their land and began seeking gold in a manner not unlike the 
gold rush of 1848 in the united States. Some 1,000 tons of gold 
was mined from the region for the next 75 years, The gold rush 
created a number of phenomena. The population began to move into 
the interior for the first time in Brazil's young history. Minas 
Gerais sits about 200 miles into the interior. Lawlessness was 
the rule, as many people tried to avoid taxation on their gold. 
Therefore, the Portuguese crown benefitted only a fraction of 
what it could have by this discovery. This lawlessness also 
fostered a feeling of independence in the Paulistas who lived in 
the region. Finally, the sugar plantations faced a huge labor 
shortage, as people began mining gold. This created problems for 
the major economic force of the region. 112 
The sugar plantations' problems were exacerbated by the 
influx of Caribbean sugar to Europe at the same time. This 
illustrated the boom-bust characteristic which describes the 
brazilian economy. When the sugar price dropped, so did the 
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entire economy of Brazil. Caribbean sugar dropped the price 
sUfficiently to convince Brazilians to seek another crop to 
supplement their staple crop. 
There were a number of crops that supplemented sugar for 
Brazil. Tobacco and cotton production rose as a response to 
dropping sugar prices and productivity. Unfortunately, cotton 
cUltivation was unproductive after the united states utilized Eli 
Whitney's cotton gin, while Brazil clung to the old, time-
consuming method of deseeding the cotton.* Yet, none of these 
crops supplanted sugar as the driving force of the economy. 113 
By the period of independence, Brazil discovered what would be 
its major export for the next 150 years, coffee. This was an 
important crop because it required a lesser amount of land, less 
labor, and it had not been fully tapped with respect to demand 
throughout Europe. 114 
Brazil grew very little in sustenance crops, with the 
exception of beans. When industrialization began to hit Europe, 
Brazil was denied the technology. Portugal wanted its colony to 
produce cash crops and nothing more. To make the land 
independent economically made little sense politically or 
economically. What Portugal preferred was a completely dependant 
colony, according to the principles of mercantilism. This 
economic theory states that the mother country would best be 
* It has been rumored that the cotton gin was created by 
Whitney's wife, but that has yet to be proven. (Heard by the 
author at Vermillionville, an old Cajun village just outside 
Lafayette, Louisiana, Spring, 1991.) 
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served by the exploitation of its colonies, while minimizing 
trade with other major countries. What this meant for Brazil was 
that it was completely dependant on Portugal, while it produced 
cash crops. This dependance would mark the Brazilian economy 
even in present history. 
The Portuguese Inversion and Brazilian Autonomy 
Brazil at the beginning of the 19th century experienced a 
phenomenon unparalleled in history-- the colony became the ruler. 
This happened during the Portuguese inversion. Following the 
successful invasion of Portugal by Napoleon in 1808, Prince Joao, 
serving as regent, moved his court to Brazil. To justify this 
move, he made Brazil an equal in the Portuguese empire. When 
Joao returned to Portugal in 1821, he left his son Pedro as 
regent of the territory. This vastly enhanced the autonomy of 
the region. 115 
Another factor increasing Brazilian autonomy was the 
Napoleonic economic blockade of the European continent. Faced 
with the prospect of economic isolation, Great Britain increased 
its trade throughout the colonies. The British helped Joao out 
of Portugal, and in return, the Portuguese regent opened Brazil 
to British trade. At one point prior to independence, the tariff 
rate for the British in Brazil was lower than for Portugal. The 
British supported independence for Brazil following the defeat of 
Napoleon to keep these markets open, which fostered a desire for 
independence in the Brazilian people. 116 
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Independence 
In 1822, Portugal tried to force Pedro to return home to 
"finish his education." This would have amounted to an admission 
of Portugal's control over Brazil. Pedro refused, declaring "0 
Fico" (I stay). This amounted to a declaration of independence. 
with Britain's help, the Brazilians defeated the Portuguese in a 
relatively bloodless battle. Pedro then promulgated a 
constitution and declared himself emperor of the Brazilian 
empire. 117 All in all, the Brazilian campaign for independence 
was painless and a rather simple endeavor. 
Following Pedro's acceptance of the Portuguese crown in 
1831, Brazil was governed by regents for the next decade. In 
this period, the autonomy of the regions was established. In 
1840, this autonomy was curtailed by the eradication of the 
regency and the acceptance of Pedro II of the throne. This 
return to centralization was fueled by a rise of revolts in the 
regions, which produced fears of the caudilismo which split apart 
Spanish America. The largest of these revolts was that of the 
Farroupilla of Rio Grande do SuI, in the far south of the nation. 
A return to centralization reinforced British hegemony over the 
Brazilian economy. 118 
During the period of the empire, slavery was reinforced as 
the major means of labor throughout the new nation. British 
pressure for abolition, however, strained the institution. The 
slave trade was ended in 1851, and, in 1871, the Law of the Free 
Womb was established. This meant that all children of slaves 
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were born free. Finally, in 1888, just one year before the 
overthrow of the crown, slavery was outlawed. with the sturdiest 
pillar of the crown removed, the road was paved for 
revolution. 119 
The republican forces were bolstered by the political 
emergence of the military for the first time in Brazilian 
history. Following the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-70), the 
military began to see the crown as an impediment to the 
industrialization necessary for Brazil to assert itself as the 
strongest military power on the continent. In 1889, a military 
coup led by Deodoro de Fonseca overthrew the monarchy in a 
bloodless coup. This ushered in the period of the Old 
Republ ic. 120 
civilian Democratic Rule 
The Old Republic was dominated by regionalism, under what 
became known as the "cafe com leite" (coffee and milk) agreement. 
The regions of Sao Paulo (coffee) and Minas Gerais (milk) 
dominated the Presidency during this period. The two regions 
traded off the position, with a constitutional provision banning 
consecutive terms. The regions were dominated by political 
strongmen (coronels) who were semi-autonomous.· Economically, 
the cash crops of coffee and sugar continued to dominate 
Brazil. 121 
• This was much like the political bosses of the united 
States during the 19th Century. 
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The lack of industrialization led to a further 
politicization of the military. The young officers (tenentes) 
demanded that the government industrialize to increase the 
military potential of the country. In the political crisis of 
1930, when Sao Paulo was reluctant to turn over the Presidency to 
Minas Gerais, the tenentes backed a candidate from Rio Grande do 
SUI, Getulio Vargas. Vargas would dominate Brazilian politics 
until his death in 1954.'u 
Vargas governed in three distinct eras. The first was a 
transitional government designed to rewrite the Constitution as 
to avert further domination along the lines of cafe com leite. 
He moved to diminish the power of the regions, while 
strengthening the national government in Rio. When elections 
were held under the new Constitution in 1934, Vargas was elected 
President. In 1937, when his term was about to expire, Vargas 
suspended the Constitution and declared the Novo Estado (New 
State). This was based on the personal dictatorship of Vargas 
and falangist economic arrangements modeled after Mussolini's 
Italy. The dictatorship ended in 1945, immediately following the 
Second World War. 1B 
The economic pOlicies of Vargas were based on the principles 
of import-substitution industrialization (lSI). lSI was needed 
following the collapse of the global trading regime in the 1930s, 
during the Great Depression. Imports were no longer available. 
Brazil moved to produce the finished products that it was no 
longer able to secure. The keystone of Vargas' economic 
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successes was the erection of the Volta Redonda steelworks in the 
early 1940s. Seen as a quid pro quo for Brazil's declaration of 
war against the Axis powers and its granting of access to the 
American of Brazil's Northeastern ports, it stands as the symbol 
of lSI during the Vargas regime. This steelworks was part of a 
huge package which saw over $600 million in military, economic, 
and technical assistance flow from the Roosevelt administration 
to Brazil. This period marks the first moment in Brazil's 
economic history that it began moving away from its dependency on 
Europe and North America for finished products. 124 
Following the war, Vargas was overthrown and Brazil returned 
to constitutional status. Vargas' Minister of War, Eurico Dutra 
was elected, but accomplished little. Vargas returned in 1950, 
but was overthrown in 1954. He opted for suicide rather than 
retirement. Following a series of military maneuvers, Juscelino 
Kubitchek, one of the most ambitious political leaders in 
Brazilian history, took office in 1955. His promise of "Fifty 
Years Progress in Five" helped to define Brazilian economic 
development for many years. 125 
Under the Truman administration, the united States agreed to 
form the Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development 
Commission (JBUSEDC), but Eisenhower terminated the program. 
Embodied in the program were the plans later utilized by 
Kubitchek for his "programa de metas" (program of goals) . 
Perhaps the most ambitious of these programs was the construction 
of a new capital in the interior of Brazil. These programs 
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tripled Brazil's external debt, and created a great deal of 
dependency on the united states in particular. Throughout the 
Kubitchek administration, relations with the united states were 
strained because of Eisenhower's reluctance to endorse the 
programa de metas and fund it adequately. 126 Nevertheless, even 
though Kubitchek did not quite deliver fifty years of progress, 
he was successful in a number of his programs. Unfortunately, he 
also created far more than fifty years of debt. Debt-financed 
development would become the fundamental policy of the regime 
that followed Kubitchek. 
The next four years were dominated by Constitutional crisis, 
which eventually resulted in the overthrow of Joao Goulart in 
1964. The military had been active in politics before 1964, but 
this coup marked the first time it maintained control of the 
government. It issued a number of Institutional Acts which 
limited political participation and legitimized military rule. 
By 1968, the military had instituted what Guillermo O'Donnell 
calls the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, marked with severe 
repression. 127 This period also saw some of the most impressive 
economic growth in world history. 
Military Rule and Economic Growth 
Termed by many as the "Brazilian Miracle," the period of 
1968-73 saw double-digit GNP growth in every year. This growth 
was funded by a huge amount of foreign capital, especially from 
the United states. The debt continued to rise, but for a brief 
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moment, it appeared that Brazil was readying itself to join the 
most powerful economies of the world. Then came the oil 
shocks. 128 
In the mid 1970s, Brazil's achilles heel, its lack of oil 
deposits, ground the economy to a halt. Double-digit growth 
rates disappeared, and Brazil was saddled with a large debt that 
it found itself unable to pay. with the United states facing an 
economic repression in the 1970s, that nation's willingness to 
subsidize Brazil's debt problem lessened. The multinational 
corporations which were at the heart of Brazil's economic drive 
began repatriating their profits and investing in the sagging 
economies of their home country. Balance of payment problems 
ensued, followed by a enlarging of the debt. There was now no 
resources for development, as available capital was tied into 
debt servicing. The Brazilian Miracle was now a disaster. 129 
The military government diminished its level of repression 
following the slumping of the economy, and it eventually returned 
power to the civilians with little or no interest in returning. 
The recent Sarney government could do little with either the 
inflation problem or the debt problem which fuels it. In an 
attempt to reduce inflation, the new President, Collar, is now 
calling for a return of the multinationals which created the 
situation the nation now finds itself. Only time, and a further 
analysis of the role of foreign capital on the problems Brazil 
now faces, will tell whether Collar's policies are prudent. 
The Role of Foreign Capital in the Brazilian Miracle 
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As seen through Brazil's historical incorporation into the 
global political economy, foreign investment has been an 
important element of the Brazilian economy. In the post­
independence era, foreign capital was concentrated in finance and 
trade. The shipping and financing of coffee and sugar was 
dominated by British capital, which was seen as a quid pro quo 
for British support for Brazilian independence. During the 
second half of the 20th century, foreign capital flowed into 
Brazil to develop the infrastructure. The united states was very 
active in investment of this type. By 1930, half of the foreign 
capital in Brazil was British, while a fourthof the capital was 
American. 130 
The critique of foreign investment in Brazil prior to the 
Second World War is harsh to the programs adopted. The 
infrastructure was designed not to incorporate the whole of 
Brazil into the national economy, but to move agricultural 
exports quickly and efficiently. In addition, the cost of this 
foreign capital was excessive, because foreign companies were 
granted guaranteed rates of return on their investments and, the 
loan capital was extremely expensive. 131 Therefore, the 
benefits accrued in this period were achieved at perhaps too 
great a cost. 
The populist/democratic period during and immediately 
following the war were driven by economic nationalism and a 
desire to rid the Brazilian economy of at much foreign capital as 
possible. Since the early 1950s, foreign investment has shifted 
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Table 12 
Free Trade Exchange Rate, Net Production,
 
And Implicit Export Taxes, 1954-70
 
Free Trade Implicit 
Exchange Net Export 
Rate Protection Taxes 
Year (cruzeiros per dollar) (percent of free trade rate) 
1954 39 54 32 
1955 58 56 29 
1956 69 68 35 
1957 87 89 39 
1958 99 72 34 
1959 170 67 33 
1960 220 42 28 
1961 350 67 30 
1962 570 74 35 
1963 850 87 35 
1964 1700 70 28 
1965 2300 63 19 
1966 2700 36 17 
1967 3000 22 14 
1968 new Cr 3.90 18 13 
1969 4.90 22 12 
1970 5.50 22 12 
Source: Joel Bergsman132 
shifted from infrastructural projects to manufacturing. This is 
a result of Brazil's drive for lSI. It was also a reaction by 
the economic nationalists in Brazil who feared foreign control of 
the strategic sector. Prebisch's desire for structural change in 
the global political economy was the ideological justification 
for lSI following the reopening of the international trading 
order that occurred after the Second World War. 133 Much of this 
emphasis on the protection of infant industry ended with the 
military coup of 1964. One of the major reasons cited for the 
coup was the desire to reinvigorate the economy with foreign 
capital. Consequently, the military adopted pOlicies that the 
•
 
81 
Table 13 
Brazil's Foreign Economic position: Balance of Payments position 
(U.s. $billions) 
Exports 
I 
Imports 
I 
Trade Balance 
I 
Service balance 
1960-64a 
1965-69a 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1. 34 
1.84 
2.31 
2.74 
2.90 
3.99 
6.20 
7.95 
8.66 
source: 
I 1.25I 1.51I 1.99I 2.51I 3.25I 4.23I 6.19I 12.63I 12.17I 
Boletim do 
I 
.91I 
.33I 
.32I 
.23I 
-.35I 
-.24I 
.01I 
-4.68I 
-3.51I 
Banco Central do 
I 
-.34I 
-.51I 
-.64I 
-.82I 
-.98I 
-1.25I 
-1.72I 
-2.31I 
-3.56I 
brasil134 
a= yearly average 
Table 14 
Foreign Intervention in Brazil's Economy 
(U.S. $ billions) 
Net Foreign Net Foreign Foreign Debt 
Direct Investment Loans 
1960-64a .07 .35 2.90 
1965-69a .08 .61 
1969 .14 1. 05 4.40 
1970 .12 1.44 5.30 
1971 .17 2.52 6.60 
1972 .38 4.30 10.20 
1973 .98 4.30 12.60 
1974 .94 7.37 17.40 
1975 .97 4.90 22.00 
source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasi1135 
a= yearly average 
United states favored: the breaking of ties with Cuba in 1964 
and the sending of troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 are 
but two examples. In return, Brazil received nearly $1 billion 
dollars in foreign aid and investment from the u.s. government, 
the IMF, the World Bank, and foreign private banks. 136 While 
this helped fuel the magnificent growth rates of the 1960s and 
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70s, it also created the debt problem which Brazil now faces. 
Economic Development and the Brazilian Miracle 
The type of development the military regimes wanted was an 
enlargement of the manufacturing sector of Brazil. Each 
successive government wanted to reach Rostow's take-off stage and 
then rid the natioq of the foreign capital that fueled the 
economic development. It would then initiate self-sustained 
growth. The united states of the 1960s was quite willing to 
provide capital for these large-scale development projects, for 
both ideological and financial reasons. As stated before, the 
military governments were anxious to support the u.s. in the Cold 
War (and in particular against Cuba) as a quid pro quo for 
greater foreign aid for industrial growth.· Foreign capital 
would be the driving force behing this new wave of economic 
development. 137 
As you can see from Table 16, the industrial sector was the 
main beneficiary of the stunning economic growth rates of the 
"Miracle." From 1968-73, double-digit growth rates were the 
norm. An almost unbelievable industrial growth rate of 15% for 
1973 was the driving force behind the highest GDP growth rate of 
the period, an equally impressive 11.4%. But, as Table 14 
shows, the direct foreign investment rate in that period also 
skyrocketed. Brazil was obviously set for a fall, which it did 
• The government was also fiercely anti-communist, and 
believed that Castro was trying to export the revolution to Brazil. 
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Table 15 
Average Annual Growth Rates, 1956-75 
Real GDP Per Capita Industry Agricult. 
Real GDP 
1956-62a 7.8 4.0 10.3 5.7 
1962-67a 3.7 1.3 3.9 4.0 
1968 9.3 6.3 15.0 1.5 
1969 9.0 5.9 11.0 6.0 
1970 9.5 6.4 11.1 5.6 
1971 11.3 8.2 11.2 12.2 
1972 10.4 7.3 13.8 4.1 
1973 11.4 8.3 15.0 3.5 
1974 9.6 6.5 8.2 8.5 
1975 4.0 1.3 4.2 3.4 
source: Centro de Contas Nacionais, Fundacao 
Getulio vargas138 
following the oil shocks of that year. Industry slowed to such a 
degree that, by 1975, the growth rate was a mere 4.2%. And, as 
the industrial growth rate went, so did the national growth 
rate. 139 Agricultural growth rates remained essentially 
stable throughout the region. with the exception of 1971, (which 
can be explained by a superb crop of a sudden rise in the price 
of coffee), agriculture fluctuated with the market movements. 
Agricultural growth rates had little or no impact on the national 
growth rate. 140 Obviously, the government was successful at 
weaning the export economy away from agricultural products, but 
the industrial growth did not last. Rostow's concept of self-
sustained growth in the take-off stage obviously fell apart when 
oil prices rose. Imports rose sharply in the year 1974 as a 
result of the rising oil prices. To finance these new imports, 
Brazil was forced to obtain new loan money, which is now 
exacerbating the debt problem. Therefore, an immense loan 
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Table 16 
Average Annual Growth Rates, 1977-89 
GDP Agricul. Industry Manufact. Service 
1977 9.8 5.8 10.7 nja 9.9 
1979 10.6 5.5 11. 6 nja 13.1 
1981 8.7 5.0 9.6 10.9 8.7 
1985 4.8 4.2 4.7 4.2 5.0 
1987 1.3 3.0 0.3 nja 1.8 
1989 3.3 2.6 2.4 1.2 4.1 
source: World Development Report141 
principle must be repaid, under conditions far less favorable 
than those under which the loan was issued. 142 
A second wave of economic growth was initiated following the 
recovery of the world economy in the mid-1970s. When oil prices 
stabilized, Brazil, supplied with new loans from Western banks 
armed with petrodollars, was prepared for a new round of economic 
growth. As Table 17 shows, the year 1979 saw double-digit 
economic growth return to Brazil. New oil shocks and a 
sUbsequent world recession soon stunted this growth. Again, 
agriculture remained relatively stable, while industry 
fluctuated, depending on the availability of oil. And as was the 
case during the "Miracle," as the industrial growth rates went, 
so went the national growth rate. But unlike the early 1970s, 
when oil prices stabilized, the Brazilian economy was so shaken 
that it could not recover. Growth rates remained quite low, and 
the ready pool of capital for economic development deteriorated. 
The debt dominated the new Brazilian economy, and threatened the 
stable democracy built on the heels of the military's retreat 
from power in 1985. Once again, Brazil was forced to land 
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following take-off. 
Debt. Foreign Investment. and the Brazilian Economy 
As I have suggested, the debt is the single greatest 
impediment to economic growth today in Brazil. It dominates the 
available resource pool of that nation, and impedes it in its 
quest for greater capital investment. It forces Brazil to look 
outside its borders for capital, especially to multi-national 
corporations which appear quite willing to exploit that nation's 
vast resources. In its attempts to service the debt, Brazil 
continues to overprint its currency, which in turn fuels rampant 
inflation. Finally, the debt problem damages Brazil's credit 
rating, which it needs for further economic development. 
As Table 18 illustrates, since the early 1980s, debt service 
has consumed a huge amount of resources. By 1989, the interest 
accrued on the debt has multiplied more than 8 times what it was 
12 years before. This is just the debt service; it does not 
include the principle. with interest rates continuing to rise, 
it is obvious that Brazil has been forced to accumulate greater 
debt just to service its past debt. This has put the nation in 
an unending cycle of debt accumulation; a cycle that is difficult 
to break. As Cheryl Payer would suggest, Brazil has been snagged 
quite well into the debt trap. 143 
The debt problem can be stated another way. Before the 
military coup of 1964, the yearly average debt was just under $3 
billion. By 1972, that number was up to $10 billion. And by 
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Table 17 
Balance of Payments and Debt Service Ratios
 
(in $ u.S. millions)
 
Debt Service as a % of 
Interest GNP Exports 
•
 
1977 734 1.3 14.8 
1979 1063 1.5 18.4 
1981 2865 3.1 34.6 
1985 5004 3.5 28.7 
1987 6280 3.7 26.5 
1989 5834 3.0 33.2 
source: World Development Report144 
1975, the foreign debt was at $22 billion. This debt fueled 
industrialization that was based on exports. In 1964, these 
exports were $1.43 billion; by 1974, they were $7.97 billion. 
Finally, during this period, Brazil replaced India as the 
recipient of the largest loans from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 145 Obviously, the Brazilian 
economy was dependant on these institutions for its prosperity. 
Debt was not the only factor in the creation of further 
dependency of Brazil on the global political economy. Foreign 
investment also drastically increased. Net foreign direct 
investment increased to 10 times its number in the 10 years from 
1964-74. It rose from a yearly average of $70 million to one of 
$770 million in that time period.1~ with the problem of profit 
repatriation and the lack of sustained economic development, it 
is obvious the Brazilian Miracle did not translate to national 
economic development. 
Chapter 5: 
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Conclusion 
The original purpose of this thesis was to analyze 
mOdernization theory and assess its contributions to Third World 
development. The theory lent itself to the ideology of 
"development at all costs," to which the result was the creation 
of a huge debt crisis which now grips the developing world. This 
debt not only stunted the original growth that was accomplished, 
but also threatens to stunt any future plans for economic growth. 
The pOlicies adopted by the military governments of both 
Brazil and South Korea were bold. The Brazilian government 
believed that the magnificent growth rates would continue. The 
oil shocks were not anticipated. The government was playing a 
high stakes game, and unfortunately was beaten. The result is 
continued underdevelopment. Although the potential benefits of a 
victory were quite great, the repercussions of the defeat were 
equally harsh. with the economy almost completely stagnated, it 
is possible that the debt may irrevocably damage Brazil's chances 
for development. Considering the consequences of this 
underdevelopment (i.e. the prevalence of the favelas and extreme 
poverty), the stakes were simply too high. 
The Korean government seems to have gambled and won. There 
are two questions that need to be addressed. First, how self­
sustained is the Korean growth experience? Put another way, is 
the growth of the Korean economy going to last, or is it suspect 
to the type of economic shock that destroyed Brazil. I have no 
answer to this question, and leave it up to the reader and 
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history to decide. A corollary to this question is the question 
of what the actual economic growth was. Korea seems little more 
independent that it was in the 1950s. Since it relies on the 
generosity of the united States, (now primarily for markets for 
its goods), is it still reliant on the global economy for its 
prosperity? And, if so, is this negative? Again, I leave these 
questions for the reader and history to decide. 
A second and more relevant set of questions asks, is the 
model of development for Korea generalizable throughout the Third 
World. The Korean model is based heavily on the Japanese model. 
Before attempting to answer this question, let me point to two 
realities which play significantly into the Korean experience. 
First, the united states wanted to use Korea as a model against 
North Korea and China. It was intended to be showcased as what 
capitalism could do vis-a-vis the citizen and the nation against 
what communism could do. Therefore, the united states poured far 
more economic aid into Korea than it would for other nations. 
Even more important than the economic assistance was the 
willingness on the part of the united states to allow Korea to 
adopt neo-mercantilist trade pOlicies to protect its infant 
industry. It was allowed to follow Prebisch's model for Import 
Substitution Industrialization without competition from the 
united states. Again, this was largely for geopolitical reasons. 
This hinders any possibility of generalizing the Korean model 
throughout the Third World. 
I offer another model for development; one, I think that is 
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more efficient and more easily realized. E.F. Schumacher wrote 
Small is Beautiful, and very few economists accepted his premise. 
He challenged economists to stop conceiving of problems on a 
macroeconomic level. We should instead try to solve problems on 
a much smaller level. In other words, rather than adopting a 
policy to eliminate policy with one program (like the Title IX or 
Point Four), we should try to solve the smaller problems. Then 
we can add up these solutions and solve the larger problems. 
Practically, this means using groups like the Peace Corps to 
teach the developing nations valuable technology, while not 
trying to turn them into Western nations. For far too long, the 
United States has tried selling tractor to the Third World, when 
iron ploughs were what was needed. Huge forests are destroyed, 
while farmers needlessly slash and burn potentially valuable 
land, turning it into a desert. Crops yield less and less, 
because many throughout the world have not been exposed to the 
wonders of crop rotation. These are the most significant 
problems. In other words, instead of turning Zaire into the 
United States, we need to work on developing Zaire. 
Rostow's biggest flaw was that he conceived of self­
sustaining growth as the ideal of all nations. He never 
discussed sustainable growth. Brazil reached high growth rates, 
but they were not sustainable because they were built on foreign 
capital. Rather than build fast, these nations must build to 
last. They must be allowed to develop slowly but autonomously, 
and protect their infant industries as the United States was 
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following its period of independence and consolidation. 
Finally, I would like to say a word concerning the New 
Confucian Ethic. I do believe that sociological modernization 
theorists have discovered an important trait among the people of 
East Asia that contributed heavily to their development. The 
Ethic places primary emphasis on education and state intervention 
to manage the economy. Perhaps the Ethic itself is not 
generalizable, but every nation of the world can learn from its 
model. Even the United states needs to return to its commitment 
to education and using the state as a vehicle for development. 
Considering the success of the Japanese, it is past time for us 
to learn from them. 
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